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Abstract
The World Wide Web knows two main monetization strategies to ﬁnance its content: ad-
vertisement and donations. Unfortunately, these strategies do not translate to the Web of
Data because its machine-processable nature renders such approaches unpractical. Hence,
new strategies are needed if we want the Web of Data to continue to grow. In this thesis,
we present three new monetization strategies for the Web of Data.
The ﬁrst strategy is a marketplace for data. Users are able to buy data in this market-
place in an integrated way, which means that they can access the complete data oﬀering
from all sellers as one transparent service. However, the users do not have to pay for
the whole data oﬀering for any given query. Instead, they only pay for the data that is
required to produce the speciﬁc query answer for the given query. To achieve this, the
query has to be executed before a buying decision is made by the user. To facilitate this
buying decision, the user receives a summary of all the possible solutions for the query.
As choosing the best set of solutions is an NP-hard problem, we propose an algorithm
which solves the problem approximately in much shorter time.
The second strategy is an auction which allows third parties to promote data. Similar
to sponsored-search auctions in the WWW, solutions containing URIs receiving higher
bids get prioritized over other solutions. In contrast to sponsored-search auctions, however,
the prioritization is achieved by delaying the delivery of less prioritized data. Typically,
sponsors bid on URIs which redirect the users to a service. If a user looks up a URI, the
corresponding bidder pays a price determined by the weighted VCG mechanism. For this
purpose, we also introduce a new click-model, which is speciﬁcally designed for the WoD
setting.
The third monetization strategy provides a way for consumers of streaming data to
share the prices if their needs are overlapping. The more queries are participating in our
system, the higher is the potential for price sharing and hence, saving money. We propose
an algorithm to calculate the price shares and study how this algorithm meets the speciﬁc
requirements that we elicited for this setting.
Using one of the ﬁrst two strategies, data providers can monetize their wealth of data,
depending on whether their data is more suitable to be sold directly or promoted by third
parties. The third strategy focuses more on the user's ability to save money by exploiting
synergies. With our work, we present new ways to build a ﬁnancial sustainable Web of
Data.
Zusammenfassung
Das World Wide Web kennt hauptsächlich zwei Strategien zur Finanzierung dessen Ange-
bots: Werbung und Geldspenden. Leider lassen sich diese Strategien nicht direkt auf das
Web of Data anwenden, da aufgrund des Fokus auf maschinelle Verarbeitung solche An-
sätze nicht praktikabel sind. Deshalb sind neue Strategien für das Web of Data gefordert,
um dessen Wachstum zu fördern. In dieser Dissertation stellen wir drei neue Strategien
zur Finanzierung des Web of Data vor.
Die erste Strategie ist ein Marktplatz für Daten. Benutzer können in diesem Markplatz
Daten von verschiedenen Anbietern kaufen als würden sie von einem zentralen Anbieter
oﬀeriert. Dazu müssen sie aber nicht für alle Daten bezahlen, welche im Marktplatz ange-
botenen werden. Stattdessen können die Benutzer nur diejenigen Daten kaufen, welche
auch tatsächlich zur Beantwortung eines bestimmten Query benötigt werden. Dazu wird
der Query auf allen Daten ausgeführt, bevor sich der Benutzer entscheidet welchen Teil
der Daten zu kaufen. Um die Entscheidung zu erleichtern, erhält der Benutzer vom Mark-
platz eine Zusammenfassung aller verfügbaren Antworten zu einem bestimmten Query.
Da eine optimale Kaufentscheidung ein NP-schweres Problem ist, bieten wir einen alter-
nativen Algorithmus an, welcher das Problem näherungsweise in viel kürzerer Zeit lösen
kann.
Die zweite Strategie ist eine Auktion welche es Dritten erlaubt, bestimmte Daten zu
fördern. Ähnlich zu Auktionen für gesponserte Suchresultate im WWWwerden hier solche
Resultate bevorzugt die URIs mit höheren Geboten enthalten. Anders als bei Auktionen
für gesponserte Suchresultate wird eine Bevorzugung durch das verzögern anderer Daten
erreicht. Typischerweise werden Gebote auf solche URIs abgegeben welche den Benutzer
auf einen bestimmten Dienst verweisen. Wenn ein Benutzer solch einer URI folgt, muss
der entsprechende Sponsor einen Betrag bezahlen welcher nach dem gewichteten VCG
Mechanismus berechnet wird. Zu diesem Zweck führen wir auch ein neues Klick-Modell
ein welches speziﬁsch für das WoD entwickelt wurde.
Die dritte Strategie bietet für Konsumenten von Streaming Daten einen Weg um
Kosten zu sparen, sollten sich ihre Bedürfnisse überschneiden. Je mehr Queries sich an
unserem System beteiligen, desto grösser ist das Sparpotenzial für die Kunden. Wir schla-
gen einen Algorithmus zur Berechnung der Kostenanteile vor und untersuchen, inwiefern
der Algorithmus den von uns festgelegten Anforderung nachkommt.
Datenanbieter können mit einem der ersten zwei vorgestellten Strategien ihren Reich-
tum an Daten ﬁnanzieren. Die Wahl der Strategie hängt dabei davon ab, ob sich die Daten
eher für den Direktverkauf oder die Förderung durch Dritte eignet. Die dritte Strategie
konzentriert sich mehr auf den Konsumenten und wie er Synergien nutzen kann um Geld
zu sparen. Mit unserer Arbeit bieten wir neue Wege an um ein ﬁnanziell nachhaltiges Web
of Data zu bilden.
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Part I
Summary of this Thesis

Chapter 1
Synopsis
1.1 Introduction
In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web (WWW) at CERN in Switzer-
land. The initial goal of the WWW was to facilitate information-sharing between scien-
tists around the world. Four years later, in April 1993, the underlying technologies of the
WWW became available to the public on a royalty-free basis. Since then, the WWW has
experienced a phenomenal growth. [Cailliau, 1995]
A little bit more than ten years after the birth of the WWW, Tim Berners-Lee in-
troduced the Semantic Web, also known as the Web of Data (WoD). In contrast to the
WWW, the WoD focuses on the exchange and processing of structured data instead of
documents. The idea of the WoD is to facilitate the processing of the data by machines.
Thus, the WoD oﬀers new ways of processing data autonomously. [Berners-Lee et al.,
2001]
One big diﬀerence between the WWW and the WoD is how the content is accessed.
In the WWW, users usually request single documents and consume them one by one.
Following the links contained in the documents, users can ﬁnd and explore other docu-
ments and, potentially, the whole WWW. The WoD does not have the concept of single
documents. Instead, all data in the WoD form one global, decentralized graph. As a re-
sult, accessing content in the WoD is more similar to querying a federated database than
browsing web pages. This fact has some serious implications on the monetization aspect
of the WoD: most monetization strategies from the WWW cannot be applied easily to
the WoD. Advertisement and donations are amongst the most important strategies in the
WWW.
Nowadays, a lot of content in the WWW is ﬁnanced through advertisement. By expos-
ing users to advertisement, content providers in the WWW can generate a lot of revenue.
Depending on the payment model, the advertiser pays money when an ad is shown to a
user, when the user clicks on the ad, or when the user performs some action which is re-
lated to the ad (e.g., buying a product which was promoted). Both the space on a webpage
and the users attention is limited, which creates high competition between advertisers and
drives the prices up. As a result, advertisement in the WWW is a very lucrative business
and, hence, creates strong incentives for data providers to publish data.
Given the big success of advertisement in the WWW, it is only natural to ask whether
these mechanics could also be applied to the WoD. Unfortunately, this is not as straight-
forward as one might think. The problem is that the query language SPARQL [Harris and
Seaborne, 2013], which is used to query content in the WoD, does not provide support for
embedding ads. Even if SPARQL would support embedding ads, since a SPARQL query
answer consists of structured data and is processable by machines, such advertisements
4could easily be ﬁltered out by an algorithm before the query answer is shown to the user.
Even worse, the machine-processable nature of the WoD creates a lot of new use-cases,
where no direct human interaction with the data is needed anymore and hence, there is
nobody to see the advertisement. This renders advertisement not very eﬀective in these
use-cases.
Besides advertisement, some content provider in the WWW rely on donations as a
main income of money. Donations usually rely on a group of loyal users who use the
speciﬁc web content on a regular basis and have an interest in keeping the oﬀered service
alive. Awareness is a crucial component when ﬁnancing a web service through donations.
A user needs to be aware of the need for ﬁnancial support. Wikipedia1 is an example of
a webpage which is exclusively funded through donations. As Glott et al. point out, the
majority of visitors of Wikipedia either do not know how to donate or are not even aware
that the website is in need for donations [Glott et al., 2010]. For this reason, a lot of data
publishers relying on donations put banners on their websites to make the users aware of
the possibility to donate.
In the WoD, the problems are even more pronounced. Embedding calls for donations
into SPARQL query answers would not be very eﬃcient, because the machines processing
the data would simply ignore them. And without calls for donations, a user might not
be aware that a data provider needs ﬁnancial support. Even worse, a user might query a
federation of diﬀerent data providers and might not even be aware which data providers
are supplying the necessary data. From the user's perspective, all data is part of one global
graph and single data providers might not be perceived as such. As a result, most data
providers might not be able to create the awareness to trigger donations.
While the WoD has the aforementioned drawbacks for advertisement and donations, it
also has its advantages. Since all data sources are integrated into one big global knowledge
graph, queries from diﬀerent users can be executed on the same infrastructure. This espe-
cially opens new opportunities for stream queries over RDF data. RDF Stream Processing
(RSP) introduces the dimension of time into query processing [Dell'Aglio et al., 2017]. As
a result, RSP queries might have overlapping computation with other queries during their
lifetime. This opens up opportunities for collaboration between diﬀerent users to share
the price of common computation.
There has been a lot of research on how to process and use data in the WoD, however,
monetization aspects have been ignored by the majority of research in this ﬁeld. Without
new monetization strategies, many promising datasets will be poorly maintained or dis-
appear as there will be not enough funds to keep the data up-to-date and the underlying
servers running. To ﬁll this gap, this thesis focuses on monetization strategies for the
WoD. The reason why such new monetization strategies have to be studied is that, as
discussed above, the WoD diﬀers from the WWW in some important respects which of-
fers new opportunities for monetization strategies but also renders some well-established
strategies, such as advertisement and donations, useless.
In particular, this thesis focuses on three topics: (1) how data publishers can sell their
data in a marketplace for the WoD, (2) how sponsors can ﬁnance data which they wish
1 http://www.wikipedia.org
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to promote using a special kind of auction, and (3) how users can save money by sharing
the processing fees for streaming data. Each of these three topics covers one monetization
aspect of the WoD which have been overlooked so far.
1.2 Background
This section introduces brieﬂy some background about Semantic Web technologies, the
economics of data, and RDF Stream Processing.
1.2.1 Semantic Web Technologies
In the Web of Data, the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [Cyganiak et al., 2014] is
used to model relations between nodes in a directed, labeled graph, also called a knowledge
graph. A node in RDF can be either a resource, a literal, or a blank node. A resource can
denote anything, e.g., a website, an image, a physical thing, or an abstract entity. A
literal is a string of characters with an optional datatype associated to it. Blank nodes are
resources which do not possess an identiﬁer. They can be used to refer to things without
having to name them explicitly2. Each resource has an identiﬁer which is a string that
conforms to a speciﬁc syntax. The Web of Data knows two diﬀerent kinds of identiﬁers,
Uniform Resource Identiﬁers (URIs) and Internationalized Resource Identiﬁers (IRIs).
IRIs are a generalization of URIs which allow a wider range of Unicode characters. In this
thesis, most identiﬁers are for illustration purposes only. In these cases, more simple and
compact identiﬁers are used to increase readability of the illustrations.
A statement in RDF is a 3-tuple of a subject, an object, and a predicate. The predicate
deﬁnes the relation between the subject and object. RDF statements are also called triples.
Throughout this thesis, RDF data is always illustrated in the same way, as depicted in
Figure 1.1. The ovals represent RDF nodes, which act as subjects and objects of the
statements. The arrows represent the predicates, which are pointing from the subject to
the respective object of the statement. Nodes can be the subjects and objects of many
diﬀerent statements. Labels with quotation marks indicate literals and labels without
quotation marks indicate resource identiﬁers.
Users (or machines) interested in the data represented in an RDF graph can use the
SPARQL query language [Harris and Seaborne, 2013] to access it. Listing 1.1 shows an
example of a SPARQL query. In this query, hotels and images are requested with the
constraint that the hotel's name should be Hotel California. Lines ending with a . are
called triple patterns. A triple pattern is like an RDF statement, but subject, predicate, or
object can be replaced by a variable. Variables are indicated by identiﬁers starting with
a ?. Triple patterns are organized into Basic Graph Patterns (BGPs), indicated by the
enclosing curly brackets. A BGP is a set of triple patterns and can be used to match a
whole subgraph of an RDF graph. Operators like ﬁlter expressions, joins, and unions can
be applied to BGPs.
A SPARQL query consists of a query pattern and a query form. The query pattern of a
SPARQL query is indicated by the WHERE clause. A solution mapping (or just solution)
2 Blank nodes are not discussed in this thesis and hence, we are not considering them further.
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Fig. 1.1: An example RDF graph describing the resource Hotel_CA.
Listing 1.1: A query which asks for hotels named Hotel California and their images.
SELECT ?hotel ?image
WHERE {
?hotel Image ?image .
?hotel Name "Hotel California" .
}
is a set of bindings of the variables in the query pattern which matches the queried RDF
graph. Table 1.1 shows an example of two solutions (one per row) for the query in Listing
1.1. The query form uses the solutions of the query pattern to build the ﬁnal query answer.
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on the SELECT query form. This query form allows
its user to project the solutions to a subset of the variables that are used in the query
pattern. If not speciﬁed otherwise, SPARQL queries are always considered to be SELECT
queries. A SPARQL endpoint is a web address which accepts SPARQL queries and returns
query answers based on the RDF graph stored in the back-end. In this thesis, SPARQL
endpoints are also called sources. It is possible to query the union of multiple RDF graphs
that are distributed over multiple SPARQL endpoints. For this, a SPARQL query must
be split up into subqueries that are submitted to the diﬀerent SPARQL endpoints. The
individual query answers are joined and returned to the user. We call queries which are
executed in such a distributed fashion federated SPARQL queries.
Table 1.1: Result of the query in Listing 1.1 over the graph in Figure 1.1.
?hotel ?image
Hotel_CA hotelCA1.png
Hotel_CA hotelCA2.png
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1.2.2 Economics of Data
This thesis focuses on data as a digital good. Unlike physical goods, digital goods can be
replicated at negligible costs and, as a consequence, the supply is (theoretically) inﬁnite.
This has some important consequences for selling data as a digital good. Assuming that
two diﬀerent data providers sell the exact the same data (and there is no diﬀerence in
the quality of service), the cheaper of the two providers should be preferred by the users.
But since there is no shortage of supply, the cheaper provider can serve all customers
and hence, the second provider will not be able to sell anything. This speciﬁc situation is
described by a model called Bertrand Competition, which describes what happens when
two sellers simultaneously set prices for their undistinguishable goods and buyers want
to buy from the seller with the cheapest price [Bertrand, 1883]. According to this model,
prices will drop down to marginal costs. However, while creating data usually has high
ﬁxed costs, the marginal costs are (close to) zero. This puts the sellers in a very unfortunate
position. Hence, we assume in this thesis that two diﬀerent data suppliers do not possess
the exact same data. While this seems like a very strong assumption, it is quite common
for digital goods to be monopolistic: digital goods like music, books, or movies have a
high degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation and usually do not compete with each
other directly [Peitz and Waldfogel, 2012]. However, we do consider the fact that there
might be data which are substitutes for each other.
Another central concept of this thesis is the user's value for a query answer. The value
indicates the maximal price the user is willing to pay. The user's value is speciﬁc for each
query answer and can depend on various properties like quality and cardinality of the
query answer. If not speciﬁed otherwise, we assume that the value is a linear function
with respect to the solutions it contains.
Every query answer has a price, which can be determined using various diﬀerent pricing
mechanisms. If the price for a query answer is larger than the user's value, he or she will
not buy this query answer. Given two query answers with the same value, the user will
prefer the one with the lower price. In general, we assume that a user will always prefer
the query answer with the largest diﬀerence between value and price. We will call this
diﬀerence the utility of the user.
Whilst the user is usually interested in maximizing utility, economists are often in-
terested in maximizing the social welfare. Social welfare is the total value generated by
a system. The costs which occur in the system are expressed as negative value and are
also considered in the social welfare. However, since the marginal costs are (almost) zero
for digital goods such as data, the social welfare is given just by the value of data which
is delivered to the customer minus the ﬁxed costs. Since the ﬁxed costs do not depend
on how much data is sold, a system like a market works optimallyfrom a social welfare
point of viewif all requested data is delivered to the customers. However, the sellers of
data will set a price to maximize their revenue. For some customer, the price for the data
might be higher than the customer's value and hence, not every customer will be served
with all the requested data. Consequently, social welfare is not always maximized in such
data markets.
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tween two diﬀerent kinds of data: commercial data and sponsored data. Each kind leads
to a diﬀerent monetization strategy.
The main diﬀerence between commercial data and sponsored data is whether some-
body has an interest in exposing a user to the data or not. For commercial data, the user
has to pay for the right to see the data. The data is seen as a commodity and the seller
tries to make as much proﬁt as possible with its data. For this, the seller sets a price which
maximizes the expected revenue. Usually, not all users will be able to aﬀord the asked
price and hence, some users will not get the data they desire. Examples of commercial
data are data about consumer behaviors and stock exchange data.
For sponsored data, the situation is diﬀerent. The goal of a sponsor is to expose as
much users as possible to some speciﬁc data. For this purpose, the sponsor is willing to pay
money, which can be used to invest into the publishers of the data. Examples of sponsored
data are information about hotels, restaurants, and data about articles for sale.
1.2.3 RDF Stream Processing
In Section 1.2.1, we discussed the processing of static RDF data. In a static setting, a
user submits a SPARQL query and receives the query answer after the query has been
processed. In contrast, RDF streaming data is processed continuously over some user-
deﬁned period. For this, there are various extensions to the SPARQL query language
which support the continuous evaluation of queries over RDF streaming data. Such a
streaming query can be decomposed into diﬀerent parts which perform some computation
relevant for the query (e.g., joining or aggregating data). Decomposing a query like this
leads to a topology for the query where diﬀerent computation nodes take one or several
streams of data as an input, process the data, and produce another stream as output. If
multiple queries are decomposed in this way, some of them might contain the same nodes
(i.e. same inputs, same computation, and hence, also same output). Whenever two queries
have the same node in their topology, the same process can be used for both queries and
hence, computational power can be saved.
Figure 1.2 shows an example topology of three diﬀerent queries, Q1, Q2, and Q3.
The arrows indicate the ﬂow of the streaming data. Note that the output of some of the
computations are used for diﬀerent queries. The consumers with the diﬀerent queries will
share the costs for the computation and source nodes they share with each other.
1.3 Problem Statement
As discussed in Section 1.1, the WoD suﬀers from a lack of monetization strategies as
strategies from the WWW do not translate easily to this new setting and new opportu-
nities in the streaming setting are not yet exploited. The focus of this thesis focuses are
the following three topics:
 Focus 1: How can data publishers sell commercial data in the WoD?
 Focus 2: How can sponsors promote sponsored data in the WoD?
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Fig. 1.2: Three diﬀerent consumers with Queries Q1, Q2, and Q3 are sharing computation
and source nodes.
 Focus 3: How can users share prices for streaming data in the WoD?
Each of these topics faces some unique challenges which leads to a research question and
one or more hypotheses.
For the ﬁrst focus, commercial data, the simplest solution would be that each data
provider charges the consumer independently for its data oﬀering. We identiﬁed the fol-
lowing challenge, which render such an approach unfavorable and hence, ask for better
solutions:
Challenge 1: Joining sources: If a user wants to join data from multiple providers, a
big part of the accessed data might get lost, i.e., the data does not join and hence, is
not part of the ﬁnal query answer. Indeed, the user can use a left join to retrieve also the
data which is accessed but not joined. But this would mean receiving a lot of data which
is not of interest and, probably, of no value. Since a data provider cannot judge whether
a user has value for the accessed data or not, the provider must charge for all accessed
data, not just for data which ends up in the user's query answer, eventually. But such
prices based on all accessed data might be too high for certain users, especially if only a
tiny fraction of the data is required to answer the query. If there are a lot of sources that
oﬀer data, a user might not be able to judge ex-ante whether including a certain source
into query execution justiﬁes the speciﬁc ask price. In the worst case, choosing the wrong
sources might result in a very low value for the user while paying a high price.
To allow users to make good decisions about which data to buy, they would require an
accurate estimate of the cardinality of the query answer when executed on a speciﬁc set of
solutions. As we will see in Section 1.5.1, there are limitations to the extend to which such
accurate estimates can be made. Hence, we propose a marketplace for the WoD where the
query is executed before the user has to decide which data to buy. However, this leads us
to another challenge:
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Challenge 2: The allocation problem: Even with complete knowledge about how
much each diﬀerent source can contribute to a speciﬁc query, selecting the best, mean-
ing utility maximizing, combination of data is an NP-hard problem, which we call the
allocation problem. As we show in this thesis, the allocation problem can be modelled
as a variation of the knapsack problem and might require exponential runtime to solve.
Without speciﬁc tools for this problem, users might be overwhelmed by the data oﬀerings,
which can be a big entry barrier when buying data in the WoD.
For the second focus, sponsored data, the WoD needs a way to incentivize potential
data sponsors to pay money to promote data to consumers. For this, we identiﬁed the
following challenge:
Challenge 3: Incentives for Sponsors: In principle, every data sponsor has an incentive
to keep the service running that oﬀers the data of interest. Diﬀerent sponsors might have
the interest in sponsoring the same service, as the oﬀered data helps both sponsors to
promote their data. The problem is that it is hard to incentivize a sponsor to invest
money into a service which will also beneﬁt other sponsors, who might not invest at all
and might even be competitors. Hence, there must be some kind of beneﬁt for those
sponsors investing a lot of money into a certain service oﬀering the data. It becomes
natural to think about applying techniques from sponsored search auctions in the WWW
to the WoD. However, this is not as straightforward as one would hope. A query answer
is a set of solutions. Naturally, such a set does not possess any ordering of the elements.
However, current mechanisms for sponsored search auctions are based on the fact that
a higher rank in an ordered search result page has a higher value for the sponsor. In
SPARQL, the requested data can be ordered ad libitum, which means that no speciﬁc
ranking on the solutions can be imposed on the consumer of the data and hence, there is
no competition to obtain a higher rank.
Finally, the last focus is about streaming data. RDF Stream Processing could be much
more attractive for consumers if the prices could be shared should their needs overlap.
However, there is also a challenge involved in realizing such price sharing:
Challenge 4: Manipulating price shares: Opportunities for saving money often lead
to opportunities of manipulating the underlying system by misreporting certain input.
The problem with such misreports is that they often beneﬁt the one misreporting at the
expense of other participants. Hence, a price sharing algorithm has to make sure that the
participants cannot beneﬁt by misreporting. Such misreports include deviating from the
original query or lie about the parameters (e.g. maximal lifespan and maximal amount
the customer can spend) with which the query should be executed.
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
This thesis addresses four diﬀerent research questions related to the four challenges intro-
duced in the last section. Each research question is addressed in one of the four diﬀerent
papers presented in Part II. Each research questions leads to one or more hypotheses.
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The ﬁrst two challenges are related to selling commercial data in the WoD. The ﬁrst
challenge is about the fact that a user might not know ex-ante how much data will appear
in the query answer and whether this would justify the price. Hence, we ask in Section
1.4.1 whether it is possible to estimate the value of a query answer prior to executing the
query and thus, paying for the data.
The limitations of estimating the cardinality of a query answer leads to our idea of a
marketplace, where the query is executed before selling the data. However, this introduces
a new challenge, the allocation problem. In Section 1.4.2, we show how to solve the
allocation problem for the customer and hence, lower the entry barrier for costumers in
our market.
After the discussion of the ﬁrst two challenges, we switch the focus to sponsored data.
In Challenge 3 we are facing the problem of creating incentives for sponsors to pay money.
Our answer to this problem is the delay-answer auction. In Section 1.4.3, we asks ourselves
how the choice of certain parameters of this auction will inﬂuence the participants.
Finally, we switch to the last focus of this thesis: streaming data. The challenge we
identiﬁed here is that participants of a sharing algorithm might exploit the system to their
advantage and at the costs of others. In Section 1.4.4, we ask about the requirements a
price sharing algorithm should fulﬁl, with a special focus on misreports by participants.
1.4.1 Can one estimate a source's contribution accurately?
Most of the relevant data for a given SPARQL query is not located at a single endpoint but
distributed over a lot of diﬀerent sources. Querying all relevant data from the respective
sources yields a complete query answer. A complete query answer contains all solutions
which can be obtained from the available sources. Depending on the prices the diﬀerent
sources charge for their data, such a complete query answer might be very expensive for
the customer. If some data is excluded from query execution (either by excluding entire
sources or part of their data oﬀering) some solutions of the complete query answer might
get lost. At the same time, the price of the query answer might drop, which can result
in an increase in utility. In order to select the most beneﬁcial (i.e., utility maximizing)
combination of sources, one has to estimate the utility of every combination of sources,
given the query.
To estimate the utility of a query answer, estimates of the value and price are required.
For a speciﬁc combination of sources, the price is dictated by the participating sources
and can be just summed up. However, estimating the value of a query answer is not as
straightforward. For this part of the thesis, we assume that the value is proportional to
the cardinality of the query answer. However, the cardinality of a query answer obtained
from a combination of sources cannot be directly derived from the cardinality of the data
involved. This is because only a part of the data involved in query execution might join
with data from other sources. Hence, one has to estimate the join-cardinality between
the diﬀerent sources. Such estimates can be obtained by executing the given query in an
approximate fashion. This leads to the following research question:
Research Question 1: What are the challenges and limitations of join-cardinality
approximations for federated SPARQL queries?
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The answer to Research Question 1 will determine the applicability of join-cardinality
approximations for buying data in the WoD. If such approximations are applicable, a
customer can approximate a query and decide afterwards which sources should be included
in the query execution for the ﬁnal result. If they are not applicable, however, other
alternatives for buying data in the WoD have to be considered.
Bloom Filters are an example of data synopses which are used in join-cardinality
approximations. The ﬁrst question we attempt to answer in this thesis is whether Bloom
Filters are useful synopses in this setting. The problem with Bloom Filters, as with any
synopsis bearing false positives, is that the error can quickly explode when having a lot
of joins. This was already observed by [Ioannidis and Christodoulakis, 1991]. In addition,
we hypothesize that the false positives have a negative impact on the runtime behavior
of the approximation:
Hypothesis 1: Join-approximations using Bloom Filters run slower when using
Bloom Filters having a higher false positive rate.
To explain the error behavior analytically, we extend the work of [Ioannidis and
Christodoulakis, 1991]. Our hypothesis is that the error depends on two main factors,
the false positive rate and the join-selectivity. The false positive rate indicates how many
new data items are erroneously introduced at each join. The join-selectivity indicates how
many data items are rightly introduced at each join. Hence, the ratio between the two
will mainly determine the relative error of the approximation:
Hypothesis 2: The relative error of join-cardinality approximations is proportional
to the ratio between the false positive rate of the used synopsis and the join-selectivity
of the basic graph patterns.
1.4.2 How can we build a market for commercial data in the WoD?
The second research question is about building a market for commercial data. To circum-
vent Challenge 1, we let the marketessentially and intermediaryexecute the query
before the customer makes a buying decision. The market then submits a summary, which
doesn't reveal the actual data, to the customer, who can then decide which data to buy.
We call such a buying decision an allocation. This does not solve Challenge 2, however.
This leads to my second research question:
Research Question 2: How to solve the allocation problem for a market for the
WoD eﬃciently?
Due to the combinatorial nature of our market, ﬁnding an optimal allocation is a vari-
ation of the knapsack problem which belongs the class of Integer Programming problems.
Hence, our next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3: The allocation problem for the market for commercial data can be
modeled as an Integer Programming problem.
Since solving an Integer Programming problem is NP-hard, we introduce an algorithm
which can approximate an optimal solution having a more favorable time complexity.
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1.4.3 How can we build an auction for sponsored data in the WoD?
As mentioned in Section 1.3, a sponsor has an incentive to invest in any data which
increases the chance that a query answer contains the promoted data. However, it is
important to give sponsors some kind of advantage over free riders. We solve this problem
by introducing a delay to diﬀerent solutions which are part of the query answer. The more
money a sponsor is paying, the smaller the delay of the respective solution. To deﬁne the
payment for a speciﬁc delay, we combine the weighted VCG auction [Nisan and Ronen,
2007] with a novel click-model which considers the diﬀerent delays of the solutions. We call
this new auction the delayed-answer auction. The diﬀerent delays which can be assigned
to diﬀerent solutions are additional parameters which have to be set by the auctioneer
before the auction begins. Our next research question asks about the inﬂuence of this
parameters:
Research Question 3: How does the choice of the delays inﬂuence the proposed
delayed-answer auction?
The ﬁrst hypothesis is about how many diﬀerent delay parameters should be chosen by
the auction designer. How valuable a slot is does not only depend on the delay of the slot
itself, but also on the delays of all other slots. If one would want to maximize the value of a
given slot, one would have to make sure that: (1) the slot itself has minimal delay, making
it the most favorable one, and (2) all subsequent slots have a maximal delay, making them
the least favorable ones. The higher the diﬀerence between the most favorable and the
least favorable slots are, the more money can be charged for the most favorable slots. A
similar argument works for the social welfare. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The auctioneer's revenue and the social welfare are maximized when
there are only two batches of solutions: one batch of the solutions is delivered immediately
and the second batch is delivered as late as possible.
The next hypothesis asks whether it is possible to maximize the auctioneer's revenue
and social welfare with the same set of parameters. We do not believe that this is the
case because to maximize social welfare we want to maximize the expected value of the
bidders but to maximize revenue we want to maximize the expected price the bidders
have to pay. Hence, our hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Delays which maximize the auctioneer's revenue do not maximize the
social welfare, necessarily.
1.4.4 How can we share prices for RSP?
The last research question is about price sharing for RDF Stream Processing. As discussed
in Section 1.3, the challenge in this setting is that participants are usually trying to
manipulate a system if there is a chance of saving money. The last research question is
about how to build a sustainable system, which is beneﬁcial for the participants but does
not allow the users to manipulate by misreporting:
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Research Question 4: What are the requirements to ensure a sustainable cost
sharing model when sharing costs in RSP?
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, we introduce an algorithm for RSP price sharing. We also
introduce three requirements a sharing algorithm should fulﬁl in this setting.
The ﬁrst requirement is that all participants should actually beneﬁt from participating
in our sharing model. Hence, the ﬁrst hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: Each participant has a higher utility when participating in our sharing
model.
Next, we require that no participant can beneﬁt by misreporting the parameters needed
to calculate the price shares. The problem with such beneﬁts by misreporting is that they
often are at the expense of other participants. We hypothesize that our algorithm does
not allow such behavior:
Hypothesis 7: Participants in our sharing model cannot beneﬁt by misreporting the
required parameters.
Finally, deviating from the original query is another source of manipulation which
might increase the utility of a participant at the expense of the others. We hypothesize
that also this is not possible:
Hypothesis 8: Participants cannot beneﬁt by deviating from their original query.
1.5 Contributions
This section summarizes the main ﬁndings regarding each research question. Details can
be found in the respective papers in Part II.
1.5.1 Join-Cardinality Estimation for SPARQL Queries
To answer Research Question 1, we study the general error behavior of SPARQL join-
approximations and evaluate how well Bloom Filters perform for the task.
In Chapter 2, we evaluate how Bloom Filters perform for the task of approximate
query execution to estimate join-cardinalities. We use our own query approximation en-
gine to estimate the cardinalities of the FedBench [Schmidt et al., 2011] queries using
Bloom Filters as data synopsis. Our evaluation shows that the runtime of the approxi-
mations is a lot slower for many queries than the query execution on the actual data.
This behavior renders the query approximation useless for those queries, as the purpose
of a query approximation is to trade-in less accurate information for a reduced process-
ing time. Surprisingly, the runtime of the approximation often improves when using less
compressed (and more accurate) synopses. At the same time, the accuracy of cardinal-
ity estimation improves because of the more accurate synopses. The explanation for this
counter-intuitive behavior lies in the fact that less accurate synopses also introduce more
false positives into the approximation process. The overhead in processing the additional
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false positives have a bigger negative impact on the runtime than the reduction of the size
of the synopsis has a positive impact. The result partly veriﬁes Hypothesis 1: for most
queries, the approximation runs slower when using higher false positive probabilities.
Our analysis of the error shows that it is indeed proportional to the ratio between
the false positive rate of the used synopsis and the join-selectivity of the basic graph
patterns. Hence, for queries with low join-selectivity, the false positive rate also has to
be very low, otherwise the error will explode. This veriﬁes Hypothesis 2 and points to
a general problem of approximating SPARQL queries: If the data is distributed over a
lot of diﬀerent sources, there are a lot of joins involved. In addition, the more joins are
needed, the lower the selectivity of each join, because BGPs with less triple patterns are
less speciﬁc and yield more solutions.
The main conclusion of this part of our research is that a customer is not able to
estimate the cardinality and hence, the utility of a query answer accurately without ex-
ecuting the query. Therefore, we search of a way to ﬁx this issue which leads us to the
next contribution.
1.5.2 Selling Data in a Federated Fashion
For commercial data, we propose a marketplace in the WoD. The marketplace allows a
customer to combine data from diﬀerent sellers in an integrated way, which means that
the customer can access all data from all sellers as if they were oﬀered by a single entity.
However, the customer does not have to pay for the whole data oﬀering. Instead, a user
only pays for those triples which are required to form the speciﬁc query answer for the
given query. Since buying all solutions might be too expensive for the customer, he or she
can decide how many solutions to buy.
This leads us to Research Question 2: how should the user decide in an eﬃcient way
which of all possible combination of solutions to buy? In Chapter 3, we show how this
problem can be modeled as an Integer Programming problem. For this, the user's value
has to be linear with respect to the solutions of the query answer. With the description
of how to formulate the Integer Programming problem, we verify Hypothesis 3.
Our evaluation using FedBench [Schmidt et al., 2011] shows that solving this Integer
Programming problem using CPLEXa state-of-the-art solver for such problemscan
take 10 to 30 seconds per query. While this might be still in an acceptable range, the
runtime can be much worse when we change the diversity, which indicates how many
solutions depend on the same triples. For certain diversity factors, the Integer Program-
ming problem is not solvable anymore for a few hundred solutions within a time limit of 12
hours. This raises the question whether an algorithm approximating an optimal allocation
can provide a satisfying allocation within a much shorter time frame. In Chapter 3, we
present such an algorithm and compare it against CPLEX. We show that the algorithm
has a time complexity of O(n2 log(n)). As expected, the algorithm performs much better
with respect to the runtime. In most cases, our algorithm runs between 1 and 3 orders of
magnitude faster than CPLEX. The allocation provided by our new algorithm is close to
optimal. The algorithm reaches more than 90% of the utility of CPLEX in 15 out of 17
queries. For the other two queries, our algorithm reaches 85.0% and 79.8%.
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1.5.3 Financing Data through Sponsors
To create incentives for sponsors to invest into the WoD, we propose to delay diﬀerent part
of a query answer. Each sponsor has the opportunity to place a bid on any resource which
is part of the datasets participating in our system. Typically, such a resource redirects
a user to a certain kind of service, if looked up. If the customer decides to look up a
certain resource, the sponsor has to pay a payment which is calculated using the weighted
VCG mechanism [Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961]. The higher the placed bid
on a certain resource, the smaller the delay of the solutions which contain the respective
resource. Solutions with less delay have a higher chance of being considered by the user
and hence, the probability that the user will look up the contained resource is higher.
The auctioneer must set the diﬀerent delays as a parameter. The choice of these
parameters inﬂuences both the generated revenue of the auction and the social welfare
of the sponsors. In Chapter 4, we perform an analysis of our auction model and show
that the auctioneer must set the delays in a way such that one part of the solutions is
delivered immediately and the other part is delivered as late as possible, to maximize social
welfare and revenue. This observation veriﬁes Hypothesis 4. Unfortunately, it is in general
not possible to optimize social welfare and revenue with the same set of parameters.
As our simulation in Chapter 4 shows, the parameters which optimize social welfare
can sometimes be very far from the parameters that optimize revenue and therefore,
Hypothesis 5 is veriﬁed.
1.5.4 Saving Money by Price Sharing for Streaming Data
To make RDF Stream Processing more attractive, we propose an algorithm for price
sharing. The algorithm identiﬁes common computations among diﬀerent queries. For each
computation node, the algorithm distributes the costs of this node among all queries
which require the node to produce its output stream. Each query receives an equal price
share of the total cost of the computation node. Summing up all the price shares of all
the required nodes for a speciﬁc query results in the total price. If the total price of a
query is lower or equal than the user's value for the stream, the query gets some runtime
allocated. There are two constraints inﬂuencing the allocated runtime: the budget and the
maximal runtime. Whenever new queries are arriving in our model, new opportunities for
price sharing might arise and hence, the price shares will be recalculated. As we show in
Chapter 5, the runtime of the algorithm is mainly inﬂuenced by the number of queries. In
its current implementation, our algorithm can serve more than 1000 queries simultaneously
within a time limit of 10 seconds for calculating the price shares.
To ensure a sustainable model, we formulated three diﬀerent requirements. The ﬁrst
requirement is that a user can actually beneﬁt from the price sharing when participating.
As we show in Chapter 5, our algorithm ensures that each participant receives a higher
utility as long as there is at least some overlapping computation with other queries. This
veriﬁes Hypothesis 6.
The opportunity for price sharing also opens up opportunities for the participants to
manipulate the model. In addition to the query, each user has to provide a value for the
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requested stream, an upper bound for the execution time, and a budget. A user could
try to manipulate the model by misreporting these parameters. Our analysis show that a
user cannot actually beneﬁt by misreporting and hence, Hypothesis 7 is also veriﬁed.
To verify Hypothesis 8, we have to show that a user cannot gain any beneﬁt by
deviating from the original query. As we discuss in Chapter 5, this is only true under
certain conditions. First, we must assume that a user has no value for any partial stream
of the requested stream. Second, we must assume that a user does not share the received
stream with any third party. Hence, the hypothesis is only veriﬁed under these additional
conditions.
1.6 Limitations
In this section, some of the limitations of the four contributions are discussed. Details of
the limitations can be found in the limitations section in the diﬀerent contributions in
Part II.
In our research, we assume that the user has enough knowledge about the available
datasets to formulate a query which requests exactly the desired data. In particular, we
assume that a user has no need to explore the datasets before issuing a query. Without
this assumption, we would have to provide means for the user to investigate the datasets
before buying the data in FedMark, our prototype marketplace. This could be achieved by
providing samples of the data, for example. However, additional care would be necessary to
prevent users from exploiting such mechanisms. Also, our delayed-answer auction depends
on the assumption that a user has enough knowledge to issue the correct query. If this
assumption would not hold, the click model we must use would be much more complicated.
For FedMark, we also assume that the user's value is linear with the number of so-
lutions in the query answer. However, we relaxed this assumption when introducing our
own algorithm. In all cases, we assumed that the user has no value for an empty result.
This assumption is based on the fact that a query can be empty, either, because there are
no solutions to the query at all, or, because the datasets that could yield a solution are
currently not participating in the market. Hence, an empty query answer is not always
informative to the user. In addition to the assumptions about the value, we also assume
that the utility equals the value minus the price. This assumption must not hold, neces-
sarily. Other utility functions would be conceivable. Finally, we assume that the user has
knowledge about his or her own value. Also, this assumption must not hold, necessarily.
A user might struggle to determine the exact value of a yet unknown solution to a given
SPARQL query.
For the sellers in FedMark, we assume that they already know how to price their data.
In practice, the sellers have to learn how to optimize the price of the data, for example by
using reinforcement learning. We also assume that the sellers are not resource bounded.
This means that a seller can serve as much data as the diﬀerent users are requesting,
without reaching a limit on computing or network resources.
In our delayed-answer auction, we assume that solutions with higher delays have a
lower probability of being selected by the user. This might not be true for all kind of cases
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and hence, our work is limited to queries where such delays do matter. In addition, we
assume that there is only one sponsor per solution. For a lot of queries this assumption
might be true. However, if a user searches for speciﬁc combinations of services, there
might be situations where there is more than one sponsor per solution. Our delayed-
answer auction can be extended to settings with more than one sponsor per solution,
however, in this case the VCG mechanism is not anymore applicable. Finally, we also
did not discuss the distribution of the revenue among the data providers. This is left for
future work.
One limitation of our price sharing algorithm for RDF Stream Processing is its scala-
bility. As soon as tens of thousands of queries are simultaneously involved in price sharing,
our algorithm might take some time to compute all price shares. Another limitation is the
robustness of the algorithm against query deviations. This requirement is only met if we
assume that the user has no value for a partial stream and the user does not share the
received stream with third parties.
1.7 Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis studies monetization strategies for the WoD. The thesis consists of four dif-
ferent projects presented in Part II. The ﬁrst two projects focus on commercial data. The
ﬁrst project discusses the challenges of selecting the most beneﬁcial combination of sources
for query execution. The second project oﬀers a solution to the challenges encountered
in project 1: FedMark. The third project focuses on sponsored data and presents our
concept of a delayed-answer auction. Finally, the fourth project introduces our algorithm
for RSP price sharing.
The ﬁrst project set out to investigate the applicability of join approximations for
source selection. We hypothesized that the performance of cardinality approximations of
federated SPARQL queries degenerates when applied to queries with multiple joins of
low selectivity. Indeed, both our empirical evaluation and our theoretical considerations
indicate that data synopses are not suitable for this task due to their cumulative error,
which also substantially slows down the estimation process. The consequence of our study
is that a market for commercial data cannot rely on such estimates and hence, has to
execute a customer's query on all datasets before a buying decision is made. Nevertheless,
join approximations have their applicability in our new market concept. Estimates can
be used to optimize the market workﬂow: a customer's query is ﬁrst executed only on
the most promising sources which have the highest potential of maximizing the utility.
Executing the customer's query on less promising sources can be delayed giving priority
to other queries. Such optimizations provide a trade-oﬀ between maximizing a single
customer's utility and maximizing the number of queries that can be served within a
given time-frame. Investigating such optimizations and their trade-oﬀs is a task for future
work.
In the second project, we presented FedMark, a prototype that implements the con-
cepts we introduced for this setting. In addition, we presented two possible ways by which
a customer can decide for a speciﬁc allocation. Using an Integer Programming solver guar-
antees an optimal solution, but the algorithm can take a lot of time to terminate. Our
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own algorithm is usually much faster in ﬁnding an allocation but does not ﬁnd an optimal
allocation, in general. Another advantage of our own algorithm is that it can handle de-
creasing marginal values and hence, relax our initial limitations of only considering linear
values. In future work, other algorithms can be developed and compared against our two
initial algorithms. With our work, we established a ﬁrst baseline on how such algorithms
can be compared for the problem at hand. Another interesting topic for future work is the
study of subscription-based models and the combination of such models with our current
approach.
We also introduced a new concept of a delayed-answer auction to ﬁnance sponsored
data in the WoD. We have shown that it is often not possible to ﬁnd parameters which
maximizes revenue and social welfare at the same time. It will be the choice of the auction
designer to ﬁnd a suitable trade-oﬀ between them. What is left for future work is the
distribution of the generated revenue among the data providers. The revenue can be used
to ﬁnance those providers which proved to be important for answering queries or subsidize
those providers which struggle the most to keep their services running.
Finally, we proposed a sharing model for RDF Stream Processing. We showed that
our algorithm can compute the price shares for 1000 queries in less than 10 seconds.
To ensure a sustainable model, we also formulated three diﬀerent requirements for price
sharing. While our algorithm meets the ﬁrst two requirements, the third requirement is
met only under certain conditions.
Future research should focus on the following topics:
In this thesis, it is assumed that the sellers of data are interested in maximizing their
proﬁt. However, other incentive mechanisms could be used to motivate the creation and
sharing of data. Users could be prioritized during query execution if they contributed
in the past data to the global knowledge graph. Future research can investigate such
alternative markets without money.
The distribution of data around the world is one big challenge for the Web of Data.
So far, we have been focusing on how to collect and sell this distributed data. However,
another interesting question is how the data should be distributed eﬃciently in the ﬁrst
place. Marketplaces could be used to organize the distribution of data. Finding an eﬃcient
data distribution while considering the supply and demand of storage is a challenging task
for future work.
Inspired by the idea of sharing the costs of steam processing, one could also think
about sharing costs for AI and Data Mining tasks on the Web of Data. By exploiting
synergies, such tasks could be executed much more eﬃciently and at a lower cost for all
participants.
A ﬁnal task for future work will be to combine the monetization strategies introduced
in this thesis into one integrated system. Ultimately, a customer should be able to combine
commercial data, sponsored data, and streaming data.
In this thesis, we proposed diﬀerent strategies to ﬁnance the WoD. Depending on the
kind of data, providers can choose one of these monetization strategies: If the data is
more suitable to be sold directly to the customer, providers can participate in a market
like FedMark and make money with their data oﬀering. In contrast, if there is some third
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party which could act as a sponsor for the data, our delay-auction is the strategy of choice.
Finally, if the data is streaming, the provider should think about integrating the data into
our price sharing model, which makes streaming data more aﬀordable for the customers
and hence, can also increase the revenue of the data provider. With our work, we built
the ground for these diﬀerent strategies. We hope that our research helps data providers
to secure the ﬁnancing for their data oﬀerings and thus, enable a more sustainable Web
of Data.
Part II
Contributions of this Thesis

Chapter 2
Join-Cardinality Estimation for SPARQL Queries
This chapter is based on:
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, and Sven Seuken. 2017.
Challenges of Source Selection in the WoD. In: d'Amato C. et al. (eds) The
Semantic Web  ISWC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10587. Springer,
Cham

Challenges of source selection in the WoD
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, and Sven Seuken
Department of Informatics, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract. Federated querying, the idea to execute queries over several distributed knowledge
bases, lies at the core of the semantic web vision. To accommodate this vision, SPARQL provides the
SERVICE keyword that allows one to allocate sub-queries to servers. In many cases, however, data
may be available from multiple sources resulting in a combinatorially growing number of alternative
allocations of subqueries to sources. Running a federated query on all possible sources might not
be very lucrative from a user's point of view if extensive execution times or fees are involved in
accessing the sources' data. To address this shortcoming, federated join-cardinality approximation
techniques have been proposed to narrow down the number of possible allocations to a few most
promising (or results-yielding) ones.
In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of cardinality approximation for source selection. We com-
pare both the runtime and accuracy of Bloom Filters empirically and elaborate on their suitability
and limitations for diﬀerent kind of queries. As we show, the performance of cardinality approxi-
mations of federated SPARQL queries degenerates when applied to queries with multiple joins of
low selectivity. We generalize our results analytically to any estimation technique exhibiting false
positives. These ﬁndings argue for a renewed eﬀort to ﬁnd novel join-cardinality approximation
techniques or a change of paradigm in query execution to settings, where such estimations play a
less important role.
2.1 Introduction
At the core of the Semantic Web vision lies the possibility to ubiquitously access dis-
tributed, machine-readable, linked data. This Web of Data (WoD) relies on the notion of
being able to access partial information from a variety of sources that then gets combined
to an integrated answer.
One major approach to achieving this functionality in a distributed fashion is feder-
ated querying [Acosta et al., 2011, Basca and Bernstein, 2014, Buil-Aranda et al., 2013a,
Kossmann, 2000, Ozsu and Valduriez, 1999, Schwarte et al., 2011a, Sheth and Larson,
1990]. It relies on traditional database approaches to join partial results from multiple
sources into a combined answer. Speciﬁcally, it divides a query into subqueries and dele-
gates the execution of each of these subqueries to one or more remote databases, which
on the WoD are called endpoints. A query execution plan assigns the subqueries to a cer-
tain set of endpoints and determines the order of the subquery execution. Hereby, results
from one subquery can vastly reduce the computational eﬀort of answering another. One
major problem of querying the Web of Data is source selection, which is deciding which
subqueries should be delegated to which SPARQL endpoints during query execution and
which endpoints should not be considered for query execution at all. We will focus in this
paper on the cardinality of the query answer as the metric to evaluate the worthiness of
including certain sources into query execution.
Ideally, a user would be able to estimate the cardinality of the query answer for any
subset of all relevant sources. Given the knowledge about the resulting cardinality for
diﬀerent combinations of sources, a user could make an informed decision whether a certain
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source should be included into the federated query execution or not. By an informed
decision we mean deciding whether selecting and accessing a certain subset of all available
endpoints is worth the time and, potentially, fees which are associated with accessing these
endpoints.
In this paper, we argue that the performance of cardinality approximations of
federated SPARQL queries degenerates when applied to queries with multiple
joins having low join selectivities. This means that such approximations are not
suﬃciently precise to allow a user to make an informed decision. As a consequence, a user
who cannot aﬀord to query all relevant sources for a given query must blindly exclude some
relevant sources risking low cardinality or empty query answers, even though solutions to
the query would be available on the WoD. Speciﬁcally, our contributions are:
 We show empirically that the cumulative error of cardinality estimation techniques
based on Bloom Filters explodes in the combinatorial distributed setting of the WoD,
which questions its usefulness for informed source selection.
 We show empirically that the explosion of the cumulative error often makes join-
cardinality estimation slower than executing the actual query. Hence, using such a
technique may not only lead to suboptimal results but even slow down the query
execution process, which is exactly the opposite of the goal of source selection.
 Using a theoretical analysis of the problem, we explain why these negative results nec-
essarily occur when using any estimation technique exhibiting false positives in combi-
nation with queries having low join selectivities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we succinctly discuss the
most relevant related work. Next, Section 2.3 provides empirical evidence of our claims
about the limited usefulness of join approximation techniques using Bloom Filters, which
is followed by a discussion of the results. In Section 2.4, we present our main result: a
theoretical analysis which explains the cumulative error and associated runtime behavior
that federated cardinality approximation techniques face in the WoD. We close with some
conclusions.
2.2 Related Work
Federated SPARQL querying and source selection: Diﬀerent approaches have been
proposed to query RDF data in a federated setting. Mediator systems like FedX [Schwarte
et al., 2011a] and DARQ [Quilitz and Leser, 2008] allow a user to query a federation
of endpoints in a transparent way while incorporating all known SPARQL endpoints
into the query answer. The federation appears to the user as one big SPARQL endpoint
holding the data of all the members of the federation. Once the members are speciﬁed
and initialized, the user can issue SPARQL queries against the mediator without having
to adapt the query for federated execution or providing any additional information about
the federation members.
Avalanche [Basca and Bernstein, 2014] and ANAPSID [Acosta et al., 2011] propose
diﬀerent, more dynamic systems where they relax the requirement of complete results
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and allow certain endpoints to fail. Their systems focus on robustness of query execution
in the Web. Avalanche [Basca and Bernstein, 2014] executes all possible queries (i.e., all
combinations of possible endpoints) in parallel eventually timing out a query when the
rate of incoming results slows down. In queries with many combinations this may lead to
a very high network load and a signiﬁcant time between querying and query completion.
ANAPSID [Acosta et al., 2011], in contrast, runs only one query plan and dispatches each
sub-query to every possible endpoint using a mediator. This results in a highly robust
execution but again, faces the danger of including a very large number of endpoints if no
sensible source-selection approach is available.
SPLENDID [Görlitz and Staab, 2011] proposed to exploit service descriptions and
VoID statistics about each endpoint to perform source selection and query optimization.
HiBISCuS [Saleem and Ngonga Ngomo, 2014] uses join-aware techniques to select relevant
sources for federated query execution. HiBISCuS maintains an index which stores the
authorities of certain URIs. [Vidal et al., 2016] introduced Fed-DSATUR, an algorithm
for SPARQL query decomposition in federated settings. They do not use statistics, indices,
or estimates for source selection.
The SPARQL 1.1 Federated Query extension [Harris and Seaborne, 2013] follows a
diﬀerent approach: a user must explicitly specify which part of the query should be exe-
cuted on which server. The extension requires the user to know which SPARQL endpoint
can provide data for which subquery and rewrite the query accordingly using a special
SERVICE-clause.
Duplicate aware source selection [Saleem et al., 2013] tries to eliminate sources with
duplicate data using Min-Wise Independent Permutations. [Hose and Schenkel, 2012] used
Bloom Filters for source selection of RDF sources and investigated the number of requests
needed for an approximation to achieve a certain recall.
Good estimates of the contribution of diﬀerent sources towards a query answer plays
an important role in [Moor et al., 2015] and [Moor et al., 2016], where users have to pay
for accessing the selected sources.
In contrast to the work presented so far, we perform an empirical and theoretical
analysis of the error behavior for the problem of source selection when the cardinality of
the result is used as the deciding factor.
Cardinality Estimation Techniques:
In the traditional database domain, join approximation has been used as a suitable
technique for approximate query processing [Chakrabarti et al., 2001]. The goal of ap-
proximate query processing is to compute an answer that approximates the query answer
without having to execute the query. Join approximations can be used to calculate the
expected cardinality and the join selectivity of a speciﬁc query.
A variety of approaches provide data synopses (i.e., summaries of the data) for join ap-
proximation. Histograms [Ioannidis and Poosala, 1999] and Wavelets [Chakrabarti et al.,
2001] have been used to approximate the distribution of a dataset over a given domain.
Also, Bloom Filters were ﬁrst proposed as a space-eﬃcient probabilistic data structure
to approximate sets [Bloom, 1970]. The advantage of Bloom Filters is that they allow
to specify the desired false-positive rate for set-membership checking without leading to
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false-negatives. Given that they also allow intersections between bloom-ﬁltered sets they
have become a de-facto standard for join approximations. Q-Trees [Prasser et al., 2012]
were introduced as a special data summary technique for RDF data. [Umbrich et al.,
2011] compared the runtime and space complexity of indexing techniques, multidimen-
sional histograms, and Q-Trees and evaluated, in particular, their usefulness for source
selection and highlighted the superiority of Q-Trees over the others.
Sampling methods [Lipton et al., 1990] do not rely on a synopsis but on a selection of the
data. Hence, they do not produce false positive matches but might produce false negatives.
Sampling methods provide a lower bound on the cardinality of a join.
Join synopses [Acharya et al., 1999] are special summary structures built for join
approximation. They are constructed for speciﬁc, ex-ante known join operations and are
therefore not suitable to the purely ad-hoc federated settings. They are, however, useful
when one knows that certain joins are likely to occur.
Finally, [Ioannidis and Christodoulakis, 1991] studied the propagation of errors in the
size of the join result. In this paper, we will extend the analysis done by [Ioannidis and
Christodoulakis, 1991] to the domain of SPARQL queries.
2.3 Experimental Evaluation of the Cumulative Join Estimation
Error
The goal of this section is to show the relative error and runtime behavior of join car-
dinality approximation using Bloom Filters, which motivated our theoretical analysis of
the problem and our conclusion that join approximation techniques are problematic for
source selection. We used Bloom Filters for the approximation as they provide an easy
and straightforward way to encode strings like IRIs and Literals.
In the following, we will ﬁrst describe the experimental setup, including the query
approximation engine and the data we used before presenting the results.
2.3.1 Query Approximation Engine
We implemented a query engine that allows us to execute joins over federated SPARQL
endpoints on dynamically generated data synopses. The query engine accepts a query
consisting of basic graph patterns using the SPARQL 1.1 SERVICE-clause to allocate a
certain Basic Graph Pattern (BGP), called service pattern, to speciﬁed endpoints. Our
approximation engine currently does not yet support UNION-clauses, OPTIONAL-clauses
and ﬁlters outside of service patterns.
To approximate a join between two service patterns, a data synopsis of the data
matching the ﬁrst service pattern is generated by the responsible endpoint. This synopsis
summarizes the bindings of the joining variables for each solution of the assigned service
pattern. The data synopsis is generated by inserting the string representation of the
bindings of a solution into a Bloom Filter. If multiple variables are joining, the bindings
are combined into one string using a special delimiter. The endpoint responsible for the
second SERVICE-clause receives the data synopsis and does a membership check on the
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string representation of the bindings of the joining variables of its assigned service pattern.
The bindings for which the membership check is positive form the basis for the join
synopsis. The join synopsis summarizes the bindings of those variables which are joining
with the next service pattern and is used as input for the next join approximation step.
To illustrate the approximation process, Figure 2.1 shows how the query in Listing
2.1 would be approximated. First, ep1.com receives the ﬁrst service pattern, consisting
of only one triple pattern ?a ex:p ?x, and creates a list of bindings for variable ?a
( 1 in Figure). These bindings get approximated by an appropriate data synopsis 2 .
The synopsis is joined with the bindings provided by endpoint ep2.com for the second
service pattern ?a ex:p ?b 3 . Note that only variable ?a is involved in the join while a
synopsis for the corresponding bindings for variable ?b is created 4 . The second synopsis
is joined with the bindings for the third service pattern ?y ex:p ?b 5 . Since this
clause is the last one, there is no further synopsis needed. Instead, we count the number
of bindings that join with this last synopsis 6 . This number is the estimated cardinality
of the join between the three service patterns when they are assigned to the sources
according to the federated query in Listing 2.1.
?a
A
B
C
D
?a
A
B
X
Y
?b
1
2
3
4
?b
1
4
5
6
ep1.com ep2.com ep3.com
Result
?a ex:p ?x ?a ex:q ?b ?y ex:r ?b
⋈ ⋈≈ #≈
1
2 3 4 5 6
Fig. 2.1: Approximating the query in Listing 2.1 using our approximation engine.
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Listing 2.1: A SPARQL query with 3 Service Patterns, each consisting of 1 Triple Pat-
tern.
PREFIX ex: <http://example.com/>
SELECT * WHERE {
SERVICE <http://ep1.com> {
?a ex:p ?x . }
SERVICE <http://ep2.com> {
?a ex:q ?b . }
SERVICE <http://ep3.com> {
?y ex:r ?b . }
}
2.3.2 Experimental Setup
For our evaluation, we investigated the scenario where each triple pattern must be sent
to a diﬀerent source. This means that it is not possible to form exclusive groups to speed
up query processing/approximation, as proposed by [Schwarte et al., 2011a].
For the evaluation, we used FedBench [Schmidt et al., 2011] as a benchmark. FedBench
consists of 25 queries and more than 200 million triples distributed over 9 datasets. Since
we do not support UNION or OPTIONAL-clauses at the moment, we removed queries
containing those clauses from our evaluations. To give a baseline for the execution time
of the diﬀerent approximation techniques, we executed each query using the query engine
Jena ARQ1. We used the SERVICE-clause to direct each triple pattern to a separate
SPARQL endpoint. We used Blazegraph2 as a triple store. Table 2.1 shows the queries
used, their runtime in milliseconds when using Jena ARQ, the actual cardinality of the
query answer, and the number of triple patterns in the query.
We simulated both, query execution using Jena ARQ and the approximations using
Bloom Filters, with a network speed of 10 Mbps, which is around the average speed of the
top 10 countries in the world [Belson, 2015]. For the query execution, we adapted Jena
ARQ to do block-nested-loop joins with a block size of 500 bindings to reduce the number
of HTTP-connections, which have a negative impact on the runtime behavior of federated
query execution. In addition, we optimized the join order of the diﬀerent queries using
simple heuristics to keep query execution in a reasonable time-frame. The query execution
and all query approximations used the same join ordering to keep the results comparable.
For the Bloom Filter implementation, we used the Guava Google Core Library for
Java3.
2.3.3 Results
Figure 2.2 shows the absolute value of the relative error and the relative execution time
of the approximation both computed with respect to the actual runtime and count when
running the query in a federated fashion using Jena ARQ.
1 https://jena.apache.org
2 https://www.blazegraph.com
3 https://github.com/google/guava
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Table 2.1: The execution time, count, and number of triple patterns of the diﬀerent
queries.
Query Time [ms] Cardinality Triple patterns
CD3 2.50E+03 2 5
CD4 3.90E+02 1 5
CD5 4.80E+02 2 4
CD6 1.30E+03 11 4
CD7 5.70E+02 1 4
LS3 3.80E+04 9054 5
LS4 5.20E+02 3 7
LS5 1.02E+02 393 6
LS6 4.40E+05 28 5
LD1 6.90E+02 308 3
LD2 4.70E+02 185 3
LD3 7.60E+02 159 4
LD4 3.10E+03 50 5
LD5 3.00E+02 28 3
LD6 6.20E+02 39 5
LD7 1.50E+03 1216 2
LD8 5.90E+02 22 5
LD9 3.20E+02 1 3
LD10 2.90E+02 3 3
LD11 2.00E+03 376 5
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The relative error erel is deﬁned as
erel =
cardest − cardactual
cardactual
,
where cardest is the estimated cardinality of the query answer based on the approximation
and cardactual is the actual cardinality of the query answer.
The relative execution time trel is deﬁned as
trel =
test
tactual
,
where test is the runtime of the approximation technique and tactual is the runtime of the
query execution using Jena ARQ.
Clearly, a relative runtime of less than 1 is desirable, as otherwise it would be faster to
execute the query and get the actual cardinality. For the relative error, it is not so clear
what kind of error would still be in an acceptable range.
Each plot in Figure 2.2 shows the relative error (solid line) and relative execution
time (dashed line). We measured the error and execution time for false positive rates of
fpp = 0.1, 0.01, 10−4, 10−8.
As we can see in Figure 2.2, the runtime of the Bloom Filter approximation is very
often disappointing. The approximation tends to require considerably more time for the
approximation than the actual query execution. Surprisingly, the execution time for those
approximations often improves when increasing the size of the underlying data synopsis.
The discussions in Section 2.4 provide a good explanation for this behavior: the more
accurate the synopsis, the less false positives must be processed. The overhead in pro-
cessing more false positives seem to have a bigger negative impact on the runtime than
the reduction of the size of the synopsis. This behavior somewhat counteracts the actual
purpose of a data synopsis to provide a trade-oﬀ between less accurate information and
reduced processing time.
Discussion of selected queries: The Bloom Filter approximation shows good results
for the runtime of queries LS3, LS5, LS6, LD2, and LD4. Also, the error is comparably
low and most of the time below 1. For those queries, the approximation can be considered
successful: the approximation is able to return a reasonable approximation of the result
size while running considerably faster than the actual query execution.
Queries CD7, LS4, and LD11 show worse approximation for a false positive probability
of 10−8 than for a probability of 10−4. One likely explanation for this is the fact that the
original false positive analysis done by [Bloom, 1970] is incomplete and only gives a lower
bound on the false positive rate. Indeed, as [Bose et al., 2008] points out, the actual
false positive rate might be worse than expected when a small value for the false-positive
probability is chosen as a parameter and a large number of hash functions have to be used
in the ﬁlters.
The approximation yields a relative error of 0 for the query LD9. The reason for
this behavior is that the last triple pattern only matches one single triple. Thus, our
approximation engine predicts a cardinality of at most 1, because the prediction is based
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on the number of those triples matching the last triple pattern which also join the synopsis
of the previous joins, which can never be larger than the number of triples matching the
last triple pattern. At the same time, the actual result of the query is also 1. Hence,
approximation technique which overestimate the cardinality will yield a perfect prediction,
necessarily. However, the relative runtime of the approximation methods is around 1.
The query LD4 is another one where the last triple pattern only matches one single
triple. Again, our approximation engine predicts a cardinality of at most 1. But this time,
the actual result is not 1 but 50. In fact, all 50 diﬀerent results have the same binding
for the last joining variable. As the Bloom Filter does not account for duplicated values
the approximation wrongly predicts 1 instead of 50. At the same time, the approximation
speed proﬁts slightly from this error by yielding a faster execution time.
2.4 Theoretical Analysis of the Cumulative Join Estimation
Error
In this section, we investigate to theoretical foundations which can explain the disapointing
performance of our Bloom Filter join approximation. We will estimate the cumulative
error for WoD queries for approximation techniques that overestimate the results due
to false positives, which includes all data synopses which are not based on sampling, in
particular, our Bloom Filter-based method. Such overestimating data synopses can lead
to false-positive matches (i.e., the prediction of a match where there is none) due to loss
of information. When approximating multiple joins, the result of the ﬁrst join (including
its false positives) is again encoded as a data synopsis passed to the second join, which
will now attempt to match all encoded elements including the false-positives. Hence, the
error of the synopsis gets propagated through each join and accumulates [Ioannidis and
Christodoulakis, 1991].
We now formally discuss the propagation of the error in a multi-join, that is, a sequence
of joins where the output of one join is an input for the next join. For this we extend the
formula for the error derived by [Ioannidis and Christodoulakis, 1991] by analyzing the
relation between the rate of false positive matches and the join selectivity based on the
following assumption:
Assumption 1. All joins are equality inner-joins.
Assumption 1 is motivated by the fact that we do not consider ﬁlter expressions in
our evaluation and hence, we only support equality joins. We will not discuss outer joins
because their cardinality estimation is trivial.
Assume we want to approximate the join result of joining m+ 1 basic graph patterns
bgp0, . . . , bgpm. We deﬁne ni for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} as the number of results selected by BGP
bgpi from the corresponding dataset. Let nFPi be the number of false positives at step i,
which is the number of elements that are wrongly classiﬁed as a match given the synopsis
from the previous joins. We deﬁne the false positive rate fpri as the ratio between nFPi
and ni.
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Fig. 2.2: Relative error (left vertical axis) and relative execution time (right vertical axis)
for diﬀerent false positive probabilities.
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Let propFPi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the propagation rate of the false positives in the
synopsis for the join approximation between bgp0, . . . , bgpi−1. The propagation rate indi-
cates how many false-positives matches are produced on average by a single false-positive
propagated from previous join approximations.
The expected number of false positives FPk for the approximation of the join
of bgp0, . . . , bgpk is the number of false positives introduced by fprk for bgpk plus
the false-positives given the false-positives FPk−1 of the approximation of the join of
bgp0, . . . , bgpk−1:
FPk = fprk · nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
synopsis error
+ propFPk · FPk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
propagated error
. (1)
We deﬁne FP0 := 0, as there is no propagated error inﬂuencing the ﬁrst join opera-
tion. Applying Equation 1 recursively gives the following formula for the number of false
positives FPm of the approximation of the join of bgp0, . . . , bgpm:
FPm =
m∑
i=1
fpri · ni ·
m∏
j=i+1
propFPj . (2)
To compare the number of false positive matches with the number of true positive
matches, we analogously compute the number of true positives TPm. To do that we deﬁne
the propagation rate of the true-positives propTPi for the join between bgp0, . . . , bgpi−1 (just
like we deﬁned the propagation rate propFPi for false-positives). Using this deﬁnition, the
number of true positives TPk of joining bgp0, . . . , bgpk is:
TPk = n0 ·
k∏
j=1
propTPj . (3)
To continue our analysis, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 2. False-positive matches and true-positive matches have the same propa-
gation rate, i.e. propFPj = prop
TP
j =: propj.
Assumption 2 is motivated by the fact that the propagation rate of both, true positives
and false positives, are inﬂuenced by the type of URI and not by the fact whether they are
false or true positive. For example, there is an average number of addresses joining with
a person, independent of whether the person is true or false positive. Hence, we assume
that there is no bias which would cause that a true positive match has, on average, a
lower/higher propagation rate than a false positive match.
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Under Assumption 2, we get the following formula for the relative error E of the
approximation:
E =
FPm
TPm
=
m∑
i=1
fpri · ni ·
m∏
j=i+1
propj
n0 ·
m∏
j=1
propj
(4)
=
m∑
i=1
fpri · ni
n0 ·
i∏
j=1
propj
.
We deﬁne the selectivity selbgp0,...,bgpj of the join between bgp0, . . . , bgpj as the number
of results of the join divided by the product n0 · · · · · nj, i.e. the cardinality of the cross
product of all results for bgp0, . . . , bgpj. It follows that:
n0 ·
i∏
j=1
propj = selbgp0,...,bgpj ·
i∏
j=0
nj (5)
and consequently:
E =
m∑
i=1
fpri
selbgp0,...,bgpi ·
i−1∏
j=0
nj
. (6)
Equation 6 shows that the higher the number of joins and the lower the join-selectivities
selbgp0,...,bgpj are, the smaller the false positive rate fpri of the approximation must be to
produce a reasonably small estimation error. Thus, the approximation error is determined
by the ratio between the false positive rate and selectivity and not just the false
positive rate. In addition, this error does not only lead to inaccurate results but also has
a negative impact on the execution time of the approximation: If the selectivities are low
and the false-positive rates relatively high, it can happen that the query approximation
mainly processes false-positives and that the data synopses based on these false-positives
are larger than the actual data of all true-positives. Thus, the query approximation might
take longer than the actual query execution.
Note that these theoretical ﬁndings should be cause for concern for building federated
query systems in the light of false positive baring data synopses. In the next section, we
will explore if these theoretical considerations apply to the practical Web of Data setting
that we are currently exploring in federated querying.
Veriﬁcation of the Analysis:We want to verify that our theoretical analysis indeed
serves as an explanation of the error and runtime behavior that we observed in Section
2.3. For this, we compared the estimated error predicted by our analysis with the actual
error which we observed in our evaluation. Figure 2.3 plots the estimated error based on
equation 6 against the actual relative error measured for the Bloom Filter approximation
in a log-log scale (as the values include both very small and very large numbers). Figure
2.3 suggests a very strong correlation between relative error of the estimation and the
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predicted error by our analysis. Indeed, both the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient R2 = 0.81
and the Spearman's Rank Correlation ρ = 0.76 between the actual (non-log) numbers
indicate a strong correlation between the theoretical estimation of the error and the actual
evaluation. Not included in the ﬁgure, but included in the calculation of the correlation
coeﬃcients are those estimates that produced a relative error of 0, which could not be
drawn in the log-log scale plot.
The ﬁgure shows that for a false positive probability of 10−8 (indicated by little pluses
+ mostly at the top left of the Figure) the actual error is not as small as one might
expect. One likely explanation for this is the fact that the speciﬁed false positive rate only
gives a lower bound on the actual false positive rate, as we already discussed in Section
2.3.
Overall, Figure 2.3 conﬁrms the theoretical analysis of the error accumulation in Equa-
tion 6, which indicates that SPARQL queries require data synopses with very low false-
positive rates to produce reasonably accurate results  an eﬀect which is much more
pronounced for queries with a low selectivity, as we have shown in Equation 6. This, in
turn, might require speciﬁc implementations of Bloom Filters that can handle such low
probabilities. However, the need for such accurate synopses make it questionable whether
join approximations that produce false positives are suitable for such tasks, in general.
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Fig. 2.3: Estimated error plotted against actual error.
2.5 Limitations and Future Work
In this paper, we focused our evaluations on queries which did not include UNION, OP-
TIONALs, and FILTERs outside of service patterns. However, we think, given the perfor-
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mance of our Bloom Filter approximation in this simpler setting, one cannot expect the
approximations to perform better when extending the evaluation to include more complex
queries. In particular, joins over multiple variables are likely to further constrain a join
oﬀering even more potential for synopses to generate false positives. UNIONS can be seen
as a conjunction of multiple queries, which does not pose a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent setting.
We will have to consider OPTIONALs in future work, though our intuition indicates that
they can be seen as a combination of two diﬀerent queries, which should not impact our
results. FILTER expressions are more complex and warrant future work, as they might
impact synopses construction. In particular, when a ﬁlter compares two bindings from
diﬀerent sources it can only be applied after the join, which may require executing it on
the actual data (rather than only on a synopsis), anyway.
Obviously, Bloom Filters represent only a one possible method to estimate the join-
cardinality of SPARQL queries. Our theoretical considerations, however, are based on the
fact that most synopses have false positives, so we do expect these ﬁndings to generalize.
Our assumption that each triple pattern must be sent to a diﬀerent source results in
a high number of joins between diﬀerent endpoints. In practice, it could be that many
queries may not have to be distributed to such an extent and subqueries with multiple
triple patterns may be answered by a single endpoint. As the WoD grows, however, we
are likely to see a rising number of queries that are getting bigger and are increasingly
distributed. Hence, we believe that our ﬁndings do point to a core problem of federated
querying on the Web of Data.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper set out to investigate the applicability of query approximation for source se-
lection. We hypothesized that the performance of cardinality approximations of federated
SPARQL queries degenerates when applied to queries with multiple joins of low selectiv-
ity. Indeed, both our empirical evaluation and our theoretical considerations indicate that
data synopses are not suitable for this task due to their cumulative error, which also sub-
stantially slows down the estimation process. Based on our analysis, one can only expect
good approximation performance if (1) the number of joins is low, (2) the join-selectivity
is high, and/or (3) there is a bias which causes true positive matches to have a much
higher propagation rate than false positive matches. These ﬁndings seriously hamper the
usefulness of current selectivity estimation techniques for domains such as the WoD, where
the number of joins involved in the estimation process is high. Indeed, our focus on a set-
ting with many joins pinpointed a deﬁcit in the generalizability of selectivity estimation
techniques which came from a domain where usually only few inter-domain-joins are to
be expected.
It is important to note that whilst this paper focused on federated SPARQL-querying
in the context of the WoD our ﬁndings generalize to any federated conjunctive querying
setting where join estimates cannot be precomputed.
The consequence of our work is twofold: First, to fulﬁl the Semantic Web vision via fed-
erated querying requires a renewed eﬀort to ﬁnd suitable join-approximations for federated
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SPARQL queries. As the WoD progresses, we will require more sophisticated approxima-
tion techniques, which are more adapted to the WoD: i.e., the need to be able to handle
many inter-source joins and low selectivity better. Note, however, that no matter what
new technique gets introduced, in the presence of low selectivity, our analysis of the er-
ror propagation adds a limit to what can be achieved by join-approximations that cause
false-positives.
Second, if the community does not manage to drastically improve approximation tech-
niques, there might be a need to consolidate datasets from diﬀerent sources into more
centralized structures to reduce the number of endpoints that must be accessed during fed-
erated query execution. This centralization will allow computing better estimations or
incorporating them into the indices.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings showed that we may have to rethink well-known techniques
such as the concept of join-approximation when applying them to the WoD. Doing so,
will both advance our understanding of these techniques and may cause us to rethink the
structure of the Web of Data as a whole.
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Abstract. The Web of Data (WoD) has experienced a phenomenal growth in the past. This
growth is mainly fueled by tireless volunteers, government subsidies, and open data legislations.
The majority of commercial data has not made the transition to the WoD, yet. The problem is
that it is not clear how publishers of commercial data can monetize their data in this new setting.
Advertisement, which is one of the main ﬁnancial engines of the World Wide Web, cannot be
applied to the Web of Data as such unwanted data can easily be ﬁltered out, automatically. This
raises the question how the WoD can (i) maintain its grow when subsidies disappear and (ii) give
commercial data providers ﬁnancial incentives to share their wealth of data. In this paper, we
propose a marketplace for the WoD as a solution for this data monetization problem. Our approach
allows a customer to transparently buy data from a combination of diﬀerent providers. To that end,
we introduce two diﬀerent approaches for deciding which data elements to buy and compare their
performance. We also introduce FedMark, a prototypical implementation of our marketplace that
represents a ﬁrst step towards an economically viable WoD beyond subsidies.
3.1 Introduction
Inspired by the WWW's characteristics, the Web of Data (WoD) is a decentralized repos-
itory of data, where many data tenants publish and manage interlinked datasets whether
indexed or not. Its goal is to provide a globally distributed knowledge base where query
engines can mix-and-match data from various, distributed data-sources towards answer-
ing queries. Most current datasets on the WoD are freely available, either subsidized by
governments via data access laws and research grants or maintained by enthusiasts. Some
provider of datasets will be able to maintain funding for their datasets and continue to be
open. Right now, however, only a third of the public SPARQL endpoints have an uptime
of 99% and above [Buil-Aranda et al., 2013b]. Without ﬁnancial incentives, many promis-
ing datasets will be poorly maintained or unavailable as there is no one willing to invest
time and money to keep the data up-to-date and the endpoint running [Van Alstyne et al.,
1995].
Unfortunately, most incentive mechanisms from the WWW do not translate to the
WoD, as data is queried by machines rather than humans. Consequently, WoD query
results often do not contain any attribution to the original source and algorithms can
simply ﬁlter out any contained advertisement removing most non-monetary beneﬁts from
the publisher. Hence, the many motivations typically entailed in authoring a web page
fame, money through advertisement, acknowledgment, or recognitiondo not carry over
to the WoD. Even though provenance techniques exist, such meta-information will not be
shown to the user if not explicitly requested.
Example 1. Consider an Intelligent Personal Assistant (IPA)a computer program assist-
ing a user by automatically searching the WoD for relevant information and interacting
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with other computer programswhich searches the WoD on a daily basis for relevant
information regarding error messages that occur while working with computers (akin to
paring osquery1 with an error recognition and suggestions database extracted from stack-
overﬂow). The IPA uses context information about the program throwing the error, the
operating system, and other relevant data to ﬁnd articles, comments, and other pieces of
information that can help understanding and solving the problem which caused the error.
Unlike a keyword-based search in the WWW, the IPA could ﬁnd information that is much
more speciﬁc to the context of the error and provide diﬀerent suggestions without any
interaction needed by the user.
IPAs like the one presented above are one of the big promises of the Web of Data
[Berners-Lee et al., 2001]. However, the question we raise in this paper is how people can
be motivated to create the content needed to enable such a vision. In our example, many
of the articles, comments, etc. about problems are written by fellow users, who already
encountered the problem and are now sharing the gathered knowledge. In the WWW,
such fellow users are credited when giving a helpful answer and are usually thanked by
others. The website hosting the platform for this knowledge exchange makes money by
showing advertisement and job oﬀers to the users. As we can see, there are two incentive
mechanisms which keep the knowledge exchange platform alive: (1) acknowledgement and
reputation incentivize users to share their knowledge and (2) money from advertisements
and job oﬀers help to ﬁnance the platform.
In our IPA scenario, however, the users creating the knowledge and the platform
oﬀering the knowledge are transparent to the end-user who is consuming the knowledge
through the IPA. In fact, the lack of any end-user interaction required is one of the big
advantages of having an IPA in the ﬁrst place. But how can such a scenario work if we
remove the incentive mechanisms which were used in the WWW to create the necessary
knowledge?
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, we believe that in the long-term many providers
of semantic data have to charge fees (directly or indirectly) for accessing their data in order
to ﬁnance their services. However, as soon as users are charged for the data they consume,
economic considerations play an important role during query planning. In particular, the
users (or programs acting on behalf of the users) have to decide to which data sources they
buy the right for accessing. This decision, in turn, depends on how much the bought data
can contribute to a speciﬁc query. As we showed in [Grubenmann et al., 2017a], it is very
diﬃcult to decide before query execution how much a certain source can contribute to a
query answer. However, after query execution it is too late to decide against the inclusion
of some sources, as the data is already bought. Whilst data synopses can sometimes help
in deciding which data sources might be worth accessing for a speciﬁc query, our analysis
showed that there is no universal approximation method which can consistently yield
good enough results to judge the economic utility of a source for a speciﬁc query. These
ﬁndings question the practicability of a scenario, where data providers charge customers
directly for accessing their data.
1 https://osquery.io
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Alternatively, one might argue, the nature of data will lead to natural monopolies and
we should concentrate on building one large centralized database. Such a database would
allow the maintainer to extract monopolistic fees for its usage, which could pay for the
data maintenance. For example, data services such as Bloomberg, LexisNexis, or Thomson
Reuters charge customers high fees for accessing their data primarily using a subscription-
based model. These sellers can price their services by calculating a quasi-monopolistic
price on their whole data oﬀering [Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999]. Indeed, most non-
monopolistic settings struggle to ﬁnd a good pricing-scheme. The Azure DataMarketplace
[Microsoft Corporation, 2011], e.g., closed in March 2017, due to the lack of attraction.
The Copenhagen City Data Exchange is still trying to ﬁgure out how to ﬁnd a good way
to price their data sets.2 However, none of these solutions provide their data in a way
such that they can be queried in a federated fashion. They do not provide the means
to join datasets from multiple providers and access can only be purchased in an all or
nothing approach, thereby forgoing the complementarities the WoD would enable. This
is a serious drawback, because customers are often interested in a speciﬁc combination of
data from diﬀerent providers that are joined in a certain way. Also, as Van Alstyne et al.
[Van Alstyne et al., 1995] argue, the incentive misalignments in a federated system based
on these principles may lead to signiﬁcant data quality problems. Finally, some users may
not be prepared to pay for the large bundles of data sold by these monopolists as they are
only interested in occasional or very partial access. These are left out of these markets.
Hence, the central question of this paper is how can we facilitate a ﬁnancial sustainable
and decentralized WoD without government subsidies or federation-averse centralization
and fulﬁll the promise of the data economy [Bublies, 2017]?
This paper proposes FedMark, a marketplace for data following the WoD prin-
ciples of federated querying. In contrast to the settings described above, FedMark
allows a user (or customer) to submit a query and decide after query execution which
data should be bought without accessing the data (and incurring the moral hazard of not
wanting to pay for already seen data). To this goal, FedMark acts as a mediator between
the customer and various data providers. FedMark executes the query but does not pass
the query answer to the customer, yet. Based on a summary of the full query answer, the
customer can decide which parts of the query answer to buy. This selection of a subset of
the query answerwhich we call an allocationcan be done either manually by compos-
ing the query answer based on personal preference or automatically by using an allocation
rule, which automatically determines how the query answer should be composed based on
the available information. As manual composition is impractical in most large settings,
allocation rules are crucial tools to deal with the exponentially growing number of possible
allocations.
FedMark introduces a new paradigm towards querying and pricing the WoD relying
on a market-based approach and principles of federated querying. This paradigm enables
data providers to ﬁnance their wealth of data without relying on subsidies but on per-
query fees. Our approach has the following advantages:
2 https://www.citydataexchange.com/, personal communication
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 A customer can buy a query answer from a combination of diﬀerent data providers in
a transparent way.
 Given a customer's query, our marketplace creates a query answer based on all available
datasets from which a customer can allocate his most preferred subset.
 The price for the allocation depends only on the data contributing to the allocation.
Especially, the price is independent of query execution (in particular, the order of
joins) and size of underlying datasets. Hence, FedMark compensates data providers
for the value of the data they contribute for the speciﬁc query answer.
Our contributions are, hence:
 the introduction of a market-based paradigm towards querying and pricing,
 the presentation of two diﬀerent allocation rules for such a marketplace,
 the introduction of a prototype system FedMark implementing this paradigm, and
 the thorough evaluation establishing the practicality of our approach in terms of run-
time overhead and utility maximization.
In the following, we start with some preliminaries about the Web of Data. We continue
with the discussion of related work and then introduce our data market concept. This leads
the way to our prototype implementation FedMark and the introduction of two allocation
rules. Next, we perform an empirical evaluation of the runtime of the introduced allocation
rules. We close with a discussion of the limitations of this study and an outlook for future
work.
3.2 Preliminaries
In the Web of Data, relations between resources are modelled using the Resource Descrip-
tion Framework (RDF) [Cyganiak et al., 2014], using resources and literals. A resource
can denote anything, e.g., a website, an image, a physical thing, or an abstract entity. A
literal is a string of characters with an optional datatype associated to it. The relations
between resources and literals are modelled as statements consisting of a subject, object,
and predicate linking the former two. A statement in RDF is also called a triple. Fig. 3.1
shows an example of how diﬀerent information about a hotel can be modelled using such
triples. Subjects and objects are illustrated with circles, predicates with arrows point-
ing from subjects to objects. Labels with quotation marks indicate literals, other labels
indicate resource identiﬁers.
Users interested in the data represented in an RDF graph can use the query language
SPARQL [Harris and Seaborne, 2013]. Listing 3.1 shows an example of how a user could
ask for images of a hotel named "Hotel California". Identiﬁers starting with a "?" indicate
variables. Each line ending with a "." indicates a triple pattern, which can be matched
to triples inside a graph. Such triple patterns can be used to form more complex graph
patterns, which can be combined with other operators like ﬁlter expressions, joins, and
unions. The answer to a SPARQL query, which we refer to as query answer, consists of
bindings to the variables of the graph pattern after the WHERE clause projected to the
variables speciﬁed after the SELECT clause. A SPARQL endpoint is a web address which
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Hotel_CA
example.com/
hotelCA1.png “88”
“Hotel 
California”
Name
Image Cost Per Night
“123 
Central 
Plaza”
Address
example.com/
hotelCA2.png
Image
Fig. 3.1: An example RDF graph describing a hotel.
accepts SPARQL queries and returns query answers based on the RDF graph stored in
the back-end.
Table 3.1 shows the bindings which would be returned as query answer if the SPARQL
query from Listing 3.1 would be executed against the RDF graph from Fig. 3.1. Each row
in the table represents a single solution mapping to the query. A solution mapping is
one possible set of bindings of variables to resources or literals which correspond to the
queried RDF graph. A query answer is a set of such solution mappings. A query answer
can contain one, multiple, or no solution mappings, depending on the RDF graph against
which the query was executed [Harris and Seaborne, 2013].
Listing 3.1: A query which asks for images for a hotel named Hotel California.
PREFIX ex: <http://example.com/>
SELECT ?image
WHERE {
?hotel ex:depicts ?image .
?hotel ex:name "Hotel California" . }
Table 3.1: Result of the query in Listing 3.1.
?image
example.com/hotelCA1.png
example.com/hotelCA2.png
It is possible to execute a query against multiple RDF graphs. Diﬀerent RDF graphs
can be made available on a single SPARQL endpoint or on diﬀerent endpoints. In the
latter case, a SPARQL query must be split up into subqueries which must be executed on
the diﬀerent servers. In this case, the diﬀerent endpoint can be combined into a federation
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of SPARQL endpoints. The (partial) query answers returned from the diﬀerent machines
must be joined together to form the ﬁnal query answer.
3.3 Related Work
Our approach is based on standardized federated querying on the WoD [Buil-Aranda et al.,
2013a]. As such, it relies on basic techniques of SPARQL querying [Pérez et al., 2009].
Here, we very succinctly discuss the most recent federated querying techniques before
elaborating on previous attempts of pairing market-based ideas in data management.
Federated Querying on the WoD: The traditional concepts for federated RDF query-
ing provided integrated access to distributed RDF sources controlled by the query engine
[Erling and Mikhailov, 2009, Harth et al., 2007, Quilitz and Leser, 2008]. The drawback
of these solutions is that they assume total control over the data distributionsan un-
realistic assumption in the Web. Addressing this drawback, systems were proposed that
do not assume ﬁne-grained control: some exploit perfect knowledge about the rdf:type
predicate distribution [Langegger et al., 2008] while others proposed to extend SPARQL
with explicit instructions controlling where to execute sub-queries [Zemánek et al., 2007].
Often, however, the query writer has no ex-ante knowledge of the data distribution.
SPLENDID [Görlitz and Staab, 2011] proposed to exploit service descriptions and
VoID statistics about each endpoint, to perform source selection and query optimization.
HiBISCuS [Saleem and Ngonga Ngomo, 2014], on the other hand, maintains an index
of authorities for certain URIs. FedX [Schwarte et al., 2011b] uses no knowledge about
mappings or statistics about concepts/predicates. It consults all endpoints to determine
if a predicate can be answered (caching this information for the future). Fed-DSATUR
[Vidal et al., 2016] is an algorithm for SPARQL query decomposition in federated settings
without relying on statistics, indices, or estimates for source selection. Forgoing any ex-
ante knowledge about data sources and any requirements on data storage, Avalanche
[Basca and Bernstein, 2014] proposes an approach that combines data-source exploration
followed by extensive parallelized and interleaved planning and execution.
Following another avenue, Hartig et al. [Hartig et al., 2009] describe an approach for
executing SPARQL queries over Linked Open Data (LoD) based on graph search. LoD
rules, however, require them to place the data on the URI-referenced serversa limiting
assumption, e.g., when caching/copying data.
Whilst these approaches provide a solid foundation for federated WoD querying, none
of them considers the economic viability of their proposed solutions. Hence, we will extend
this foundation with a market-based allocation approach to ensure economic viability.
Market-based Approaches towards Resource Allocation in Computational Sys-
tems: The idea to use markets to allocate computational resources is almost as old as
computers. Already in the 1960s, researchers used an auction-like method to determine
who gets access to a PDP-1, the world's ﬁrst interactive, commercial computer [Suther-
land, 1968]. Since then, many market-based approaches for computational systems have
been proposed.
Early research on market-based scheduling focused on the eﬃciency of computational
resource allocation. The Enterprise system [Malone et al., 1983] introduced a market for
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computational tasks. It eﬃciently allocated the tasks to multiple LAN-connected nodes,
where task processors broadcast requests for bids and bid on tasks. Likewise, Spawn [Wald-
spurger et al., 1992] utilized a market mechanism to optimize the use of idle resources in a
network of workstations. More recently, [Lai et al., 2005] proposed Tycoon, a distributed
computation cluster, featuring a resource allocation model. The authors claim that an
economic mechanism is vital for large scale resource allocationa common problem on
the Web. Furthermore, [Auyoung et al., 2006] demonstrates how proﬁt-aware algorithms
outperform non-proﬁt aware schedulers across a broad range of scenarios.
In data processing centric scenarios, [Labrinidis et al., 2007] applied market-based op-
timizations to real-time query answering systems. [Stonebraker et al., 1996] proposed a
WAN-scale Relational Database Management System with a market-based optimizer in-
stead of a traditional cost-based one. [Dash et al., 2009] proposed a market-based approach
for cloud cache optimization taking into account a user's value for getting an answer to a
query. However, their approach focuses on the cost-side of cloud computing.
For relational databases, markets for SQL queries were proposed which sell data in-
stead of computational resources for answering queries and use arbitrage-free pricing
schemes to calculate payments [Deep and Koutris, 2017, Koutris et al., 2013]. [Wang
et al., 2016] proposed an auction mechanism for data which considers the negative exter-
nalities of allocating data to diﬀerent buyers. However, they do not consider the possibility
of joining datasets from diﬀerent providers, which is an important aspect of the scenario
we are investigating. To the best of our knowledge, none of these systems considers partial
answers due to budget constraints or the possibly diﬀering valuations of various users/-
queries, which is very typical in the WoD.
As a precursor to our research, we conducted a pilot study simulating a market plat-
form for the WoD [Zollinger et al., 2013]. This paper here represents a signiﬁcant rework
of the old pilot as it proposes a complete model, an improved market analysis, and a
prototype implementation instead of a simulation. In [Moor et al., 2015], we introduced
the idea of using a double-auction for the WoD and showed the deﬁciency of the thresh-
old rule in this setting together with three ways to correct them. However, our approach
assumed that we have access to accurate join-estimates to produce satisfying results  an
assumption which might be hard to enforce in the WoD. In [Grubenmann et al., 2017b],
we presented our vision of a marketplace which allows customers to buy data from decen-
tralized sellers in an integrated way. In this paper, we fulﬁl this vision and present our
implementation of a federated marketplace for such decentralized data.
3.4 Market Concept
We begin to describe our market concept by continuing Example 1 from Section 3.1.
Throughout this paper, we will extend this example to show how to decide which solution
mappings to include in the customer's query answer and how much the customer must
pay for it.
Example 2. Consider a user who encounters the error message "0x12345678" while
working with the (ﬁctive) Integrated Development Environment (IDE) Hack IDE on a
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Java program. The IPA will recognize that the problem occurred and search for suggestions
to ﬁx the problem related to the error message. The IPA will order the diﬀerent suggestions
to the problem by their success rate. The IPA will use other information available, like
the operating system, to reﬁne the search and to get only relevant suggestions. Listing
3.2 shows how a SPARQL query generated by the IPA might look light. Each row of the
query answer represents one possible suggestion to the problem with the corresponding
success rate.
We assume that at least part of the data needed to answer the query requires a payment
from the user. In order to autonomously retrieve the query answer, the IPA buys the
required data on behalf of the user in our marketplace. The marketplace ﬁnds the providers
that oﬀer datasets to answer this query. There might be multiple combinations of providers
that would yield a non-empty query answer. Some of them might provide only suggestions
without success ratings; others might provide only success ratings for suggestions, and
some might provide both. As a result, there are multiple diﬀerent combinations of datasets
which produce (possibly) diﬀerent query answers. Some of the query answers may contain
only a few suggestions and ratings, whereas others may contain many, or none.
Listing 3.2: A SPARQL query asking an IPA can use to retrieve suggestions to a problem
indicated by an error message.
PREFIX ex: <http://example.com/>
SELECT ?suggestion ?rate WHERE {
?suggestion ex:success_rate ?rate .
?suggestion ex:err_code "0x12345678" .
?suggestion ex:program ex:hack_ide .
?suggestion ex:language ex:java .
?suggestion ex:os ex:os_x .
} ORDER BY DESC(?rate)
At the core of FedMark lies the ability for a customer to join data from diﬀerent
providers to buy solution mappings to a given query. Instead of buying all the solution
mappings contained in a query answer, FedMark allows a customer to select a subset of
the solution mappingswhich we call an allocationand only paying the price of the
allocated solution mappings.
Note that an allocation is also a query answer. We will refer to the result of the
query execution as query answer and the result of the allocation process as allocation to
emphasize the diﬀerence.
For a speciﬁc query, diﬀerent combinations of providers' data might result in diﬀerent
(even empty) query answers. Our marketplace needs to (1) enable the customer to make
an informed decision about which solution mappings to include into the allocation and
(2) decide how much money has to be paid to each provider.
We use the following deﬁnition throughout the paper to denote single solution map-
pings, query answers, and allocations:
Deﬁnition 1 (Solution Mapping and Query Answer). We denote as Ω the set of
all possible solution mappings. We denote as ω ∈ Ω a single solution mapping. A query
answer ρ ⊆ Ω is a set of solution mappings.
3.4 Market Concept 51
Deﬁnition 2 (Allocation). An allocation a ⊆ ρ is a set of solution mappings which are
chosen from the query answer ρ.
We now introduce the four diﬀerent entities our market concept brings together,
providers, hosts, customers and the marketplace, all depicted in Fig. 3.2. In the follow-
ing, we further elaborate on these entities before introducing an operationalization of our
marketplace in Section 3.6.
Host
Payment
Data 
Product
Data 
Product
Marketplace
Allocation
Customer
Provider Provider
Host
Data 
Product
Data 
Product
Provider
ProvidesProvidesProvidesProvides
Query Execution
Query Answer AllocationRule
Fig. 3.2: Customer, Host, and Provider in the marketplace.
3.4.1 Provider
A provider is the originator of some data, which is used in the production of a query
answer. Providers can group their data into diﬀerent data products having diﬀerent prices
per triple. On the data level, a data product is just a collection of RDF-graphs, which
are accessible under the same license. In addition to the price, data providers can specify
other meta-data that might be relevant for customers such as terms/conditions of access,
recentness, or origin of the underlying raw data. Providers are responsible for the quality
of data, including recentness, consistency and accuracy [Dustdar et al., 2012].
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Deﬁnition 3 (Data Products and Prices). We will denote data products with
P1, . . . , Pk and their price with pi1, . . . , pik. Each Product Pi consists of a collection Gi
of RDF graphs.
The providers set the optimal price based on market conditions. This price can be
learned, e.g., using reinforcement learning. The price pi1 of the data product Pi indicates
the payment that is involved when using an RDF-Triple contained in the data product for
an allocation. This is an important aspect of our market concept: A provider is only payed
for those triples which are allocated. Triples which are accessed during query execution
but not allocated, do not receive a payment from the customer. The reasons for FedMark
to only charge for allocated triples are the following:
1. If customers would have to pay for all the accessed triples, allocated or not, they would
loose some of the paid triples by operations like joins, projections, and ﬁlters. Hence,
it could be more beneﬁcial to omit ﬁlters and projections and perform (left) outer joins
to get as much data as possible for the same price. This would incentivize customers
to obtain data they do not need and optimize the query for the best data yield for
a given price. We do not believe that it is desirable to create a market where such
meta-optimizations are required from a customer to maximize the utility they can get
out of our market.
2. If providers would be compensated for accessed triples, the same query could yield
very diﬀerent revenue for a seller depending on query execution. Especially in join-
operations, constraints from previous joins can vastly reduce the data that has to be
accessed. This means that providers whose data is accessed earlier during query exe-
cution have the tendency to sell more data. In extreme cases, the price of an allocation
is mainly dominated by the provider who is accessed ﬁrst which, in turn, also receives
the majority of the revenue. We believe that this potential for very unbalanced vending
of data is not desirable.
3. Compensating accessed triples would create wrong incentives for the data providers:
they would be able to increase revenue by increasing the amount of accessed triples,
even if those additional triples do not contribute in any way to the ﬁnal query answer.
Providers would basically be encouraged to produce as much dead weight data 
data which is not really useful but has to be accessed during query execution because
their lack of any use is only discovered after query execution  as possible to maximize
revenue.
4. Charging for accessed triples adds an additional layer of complexity for query planning
and optimization. In particular, the marketplace would have to estimate how many
triples have to be accessed to calculate the price of a speciﬁc allocation prior to query
execution. However, as we have shown in [Grubenmann et al., 2017a], such estimations
can be very unreliable. A high discrepancy between estimated price and actual price
can be very devastating for such a marketplace.
Note that providers do not serve their data; this is done by separate entities, the
hosts. The separation between host and provider allows for more ﬂexible business models
for data provision, as some providers might have an initial budget to create some data
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(e.g., government subsidies) but do not have the funds to cover the operating costs for
running a SPARQL endpoint or may have other reasons to outsource the actual data
provision. Providers can decide to act at the same time as a host for their own and/or
other provider's data. Nevertheless, the market distinguishes between the two diﬀerent
roles, provider and host, and treats them as separate entities.
Data providers rely on the hosts to make their data available to the marketplace and
thus, enable customers to buy their data. Similar to aWebhost for traditional Web content,
the hosts in our market concept are paid by the provider based on some service agreement.
Hence, the providers have to include the hosting costs into their pricing decision.
Similar to other digital goods such as software, eBooks, or digital music, the customer
does not buy the good itself but buys the right to use it under certain terms. For example,
most usage rights for digital goods do not allow their resale to third parties. It is, however,
the task of the provider to specify the exact terms under which the speciﬁc good is sold.
We elaborate on the role of providers in the following example:
Example 3. Data providers who want to contribute data to the query introduced in Exam-
ple 2 must oﬀer data products which include data about suggestions to the programming
problems or success ratings of those suggestions. Every query answer that requires data
from one or several such data products results in some payments for the data providers.
Consider a data product PA with a price of $0.10 per triple providing success ratings
for suggestions. This means that PA can oﬀer triples matching the ﬁrst triple pattern
in Listing 3.2. PA is basically running a service where users are reporting on the failure
or success of certain suggestions. Consider further two data products PB and PC with
prices of $0.02 and $0.03 per triple, respectively, providing a database with the actual
suggestions to various problems. PB and PC both can oﬀer triples matching all but the
ﬁrst triple pattern in Listing 3.2.
In this example, we assume that PB and PC do not have overlapping data regarding
suggestions. However, PA has overlapping data with both PB and PC , which means PA
provides success ratings to the suggestions provided by PB and PC . This means that there
are two diﬀerent ways how a solution mapping can be obtained to the query in Listing
3.2. Either the data from PA is joined with the data from PB, in which case the solution
mapping would cost $0.18 (1 triple from PA for $0.10 and 4 triples from PB for $0.02),
or the data from PA is joined with the data from PC , in which case the solution mapping
would cost $0.22 (1 triple from PA for $0.10 and 4 triples from PB for $0.03).
3.4.2 Host
Hosts operate computers that run SPARQL endpoints for querying data products. They
provide the computational and network resources needed to query the providers' data
products. Hence, they ensure the reliability, availability, security, and performance, which
are usually speciﬁed as Quality of Service [Dustdar et al., 2012].
Like cloud service providers, hosts incur the ﬁxed cost of operating the infrastructure,
possibly some variable cost relative in the size of the data they store, and some marginal
cost in form of the computational resources involved for each query they execute. The
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host's marginal costs occur whenever the providers' data are queried, independently of
whether any data product will eventually get allocated or not. Similar to a Webhost for
traditional Web content, the hosts in our market concept have to charge the data providers
to cover their costs and make some proﬁt.
Note that a host can store data from multiple data providers and that some data
providers may choose to act as their own host. A host has to make sure that nobody can
access the data without agreeing to the terms deﬁned by the providers.
3.4.3 Customer and Allocation Rule
A customer is a person, or a program acting on behalf of a person, who has a SPARQL
query and wants to buy an allocation of solution mappings to this query. Depending on
the marketplace, the customer might have the choice to use his or her own allocation rule,
use one of the marketplace's built-in allocation rules, or use an allocation rule provided
by a third party.
The allocation rule sits between the marketplace and the customer. Conceptually,
the allocation rule is an independent entity which takes a query answer as input and
produces an allocation as output. Practically, the allocation rule can be (1) a part of the
marketplace, in which case the user has to provide the marketplace with the necessary
parameters for the speciﬁc allocation rule to run the allocation process, (2) a part of
the the customer, in which case the customer has to inform the marketplace about the
chosen allocation, (3) or, an independent entity, in which case this entity has to get the
necessary parameters for the speciﬁc allocation rule from the customer, has to inform
the marketplace about the allocation decision, and has to forward the allocation to the
customer once the payments are done. The third option is in particular useful if the
allocation process is computationally expensive.
The marketplace will not deliver the full query answer to the allocation rule but will
anonymize the query answer such that the allocation process has enough information to
choose an allocation. Once the allocation rule informs the marketplace about the chosen
allocation and the payments are done, the marketplace will deliver the actual data. In
Section 3.5 we will discuss the process of anonymization and in Section 3.6 will discuss
the allocation process in detail.
3.4.4 Marketplace
The role of the marketplace is to coordinate the exchanges between the customers posing
queries and the hosts serving answers based on the providers' data products. As such
it can be seen as an extension of a traditional federated query engine with economic
considerations.
The marketplace allows a customer to buy an allocation made from the data providers'
triples. For this, the market needs to determine the solution mappings which can be al-
located. Based on our previous work in [Grubenmann et al., 2017a], it is unlikely that an
allocation based on some data synopses will produce satisfying results for the customer.
Hence, the marketplace has to execute the customer's query to create the solution map-
pings which could be potentially allocated. The marketplace can either run the query
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on all, for the query relevant, data products or rely on some source selection and join-
prediction service (see [Saleem et al., 2016] for a survey) to preselect a set of the most
promising data products.
The customer's payment for an allocation is independent of the query execution. Con-
sequently, the marketplace can optimize the query execution based on traditional federated
query optimization techniques without having to consider the prices of the diﬀerent data
products. After the query execution, the customer has to decide which of the obtained
solution mappings to buy. Either the customer decides based on an allocation rule or di-
rectly chooses a set of solution mappings. This means that the market might execute the
query on some data products' triples which might not be included in the customer's allo-
cation, eventually. The customer has to pay the price for all allocated solution mappings
to the marketplace, which redirects the money to the respective provider.
As discussed before, the providers will pay the hosts for their services. In addition, the
providers also have to pay the marketplace a certain fee to keep it operational. Since the
hosts and the marketplace are ﬁnancially compensated by the providers, the providers
will include these payments into their pricing decision. In addition, the market can use
part of the generated revenue to subsidize providers which did not get allocated. However,
if a provider fails to get allocated over a longer time, the provider's data might simply
not be relevant at all, and the market can decide to stop subsidizing such providers. The
payment to the host and the payment to the marketplace are transparent to the customer.
Hence, the customer's allocation rule has to consider only the prices indicated by the data
providers and not any additional payments to the hosts or market. Fig. 3.3 illustrates the
money ﬂow between marketplace, providers, hosts, and the customer. The solid arrows
indicate payments which are inﬂicted whenever an allocation is delivered to a customer.
The customer pays the marketplace which in turn pays the contributing providers. Note
that in Fig. 3.3, only one provider is contributing to the allocation and hence, only this
provider is payed. All the providers in the marketplace have to pay service fees to the
marketplace and the hosts, indicated by the dashed arrows, which are payed independent
of the payment from the customer to the marketplace and to the providers.
3.5 Implementation: FedMark
In this section, we present our implementation of FedMark. FedMark is based on the
federated querying engine FedX [Schwarte et al., 2011b]. The core idea of FedMark is
that each data product is represented as RDF statements, which describe the RDF data
the product contains and any meta-information about the data. This allows one to access
the necessary information about all data products as well as their contents with a single,
federated SPARQL query. Additionally, it is possible to restrict the query answer including
only providers having speciﬁc properties by changing the query, accordingly. We will now
show how a SPARQL query can be rewritten to (1) extract the necessary additional
information about the product and (2) exploit the information about a product to restrict
the query answer.
In traditional federated SPARQL query execution, a SPARQL query is split up into
subqueries which are sent to diﬀerent endpoints. Combining the (sub-)query answers from
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Fig. 3.3: The customer pays the marketplace which forwards the money to the providers.
The providers pay the marketplace and the hosts a certain fee for their services.
the diﬀerent subqueries results in the ﬁnal query answer. Instead of sending the subqueries
directly to the endpoints, FedMark replaces each occurrence of a triple pattern inside a
subquery by a more complex graph pattern. This new graph pattern encloses the triple
pattern into a GRAPH graph pattern. A GRAPH graph pattern uses the GRAPH-keyword to
refer to the (named) RDF-graph which contains the matched triple pattern. FedMark also
adds another triple pattern to refer to the product which contains the RDF-graph. Listing
3.3 shows the general form of such a graph pattern. The ?graph variable will be bound
to the name (URI) of the graph which contains the triple matching the original triple
pattern. If a product contains a certain RDF graph, this is expressed by the statement
?product market:contains ?graph, where ?product will be bound to the URI
of the product. By referring to the URI of the product by using the variable ?product,
one can extract further information, e.g. the price, from the data product or restrict the
query answer, e.g. by allowing only products having a rating greater than 8.0 (Listing
3.4).
Listing 3.3: A Graph Pattern used for the execution of subqueries in FedMark.
GRAPH ?graph {
[original triple pattern]
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}
?product market:contains ?graph .
Listing 3.4: Additional information about a product are extracted and ﬁltered.
?product market:price_usd ?price .
?product market:rating ?rating . FILTER (?rating >= 8)
Once the query is rewritten as described above, FedMark can execute the new sub-
queries on the available endpoints and create the query answer. This query answer is the
basis on which the allocation rules can now decide which solution mappings to allocate.
To prevent revealing the actual data before payment, FedMark does not give the actual
query answer to the allocation rule. Instead, FedMark anonymizes the triples used to form
the diﬀerent solution mappings and reveals to the allocation a summary which contains
(1) the anonymized triples which are needed to form a speciﬁc solution mapping and
(2) all meta-data available for these anonymized triples.
Table 3.2 shows an example of such a summary. Each row in the left table represents
one solution mapping of the query answer. The right table illustrates potential meta-data
which could be available for the triples.
Table 3.2: Example Summary for the Allocation Rule
Solution Mapping Triples
1 t1, t2
2 t1, t3
3 t2, t3
Triple Price Quality
t1 $0.01 ?
t2 $0.02 ? ? ?
t3 $0.03 ? ?
3.6 Allocation Rules
As introduced in the last section, a customer can use an allocation rule to instruct a
program which solution mappings should be allocated and returned. In contrast to a
manual selection, an allocation rule allows a customer to automatize the whole process of
buying an allocation. This possible automatization is an important aspect of a machine
processable WoD, as it allows a customer to instruct a program to buy and process
semantic data as needed without any interference from the customer.
The allocation rule is not part of the core concept of FedMark, as our marketplace
does not have to know how the customer decided for a speciﬁc allocation. The only im-
portant information is which solution mappings are allocated by the customer. Hence, the
allocation rule is transparent to FedMark and only its outcome is important. However,
implementations of our FedMark concept can provide helpful interfaces and predeﬁned
allocation rules to support customers with formulating and implementing an appropri-
ate allocation rule. Eventually, it is the responsibility of the customer to make a good
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allocation decision or come up with a good allocation rule to beneﬁt most from the data
FedMark can oﬀer.
In the following, we want to present diﬀerent allocation rules which could be imple-
mented by the customer. As mentioned before, FedMark does not natively provide or
constraint the allocation rule. Hence, the presented allocation rules are just a selection
of possible allocation rules. We decided to discuss these allocation rules because they il-
lustrate an interesting trade-oﬀ between optimality of the allocation and scalability with
respect to the number of available solution mappings.
All allocation rules which we will present here have in common that they try to ﬁnd
an allocation which maximizes the customer's utility. We assume that the utility is quasi-
linear. This means that the utility of an allocation is the value a customer has for this
speciﬁc allocation minus the price the customer has to pay for it. The customer's value
indicates how much the customer is maximally willing to pay for a speciﬁc allocation.
The price of an allocation is just the sum of the prices for each triple, as indicated
by the data providers. The value of an allocation, however, is a private knowledge of the
customer and needs to be deﬁned with a function, the valuation. The valuation is used
by the allocation rule to assert the value of a speciﬁc allocation. In the following, we will
restrict ourselves to valuations which are linear with respect to the solution mappings, this
means that the customer's value for an allocation is the sum of the values of the solution
mappings contained in the allocation. The valuation is used to discriminate between
diﬀerent possible allocations containing diﬀerent solution mappings.
Deﬁnition 4 (Linear Valuation). A linear valuation is a linear function V : P(Ω)→
R+ that assigns a value to each allocation a ⊆ ρ. The valuation has the form a =
{ω1, . . . , ωn} 7→
n∑
i=1
v(ωi), where v(ωi) =: vi is the customer's value for solution mapping
ωi.
Deﬁnition 5 (Customer's Utility). The customer's utility u ∈ R for an allocation a is
the diﬀerence between the customer's value v = V (a) of the allocation minus its payment
Π(a), where Π : P(Ω)→ R+ is a function deﬁned by the marketplace that determines the
customer's payment for the allocation.
In addition to the valuation, the customer has the possibility to add a budget constraint.
A budget constraint acts as a cap on the payment for the customer and allows the customer
control over the maximal amount spent for an allocation.
Returning to our example, we include the customer's valuation:
Example 4. A customer might be willing to pay up to $0.25 for any solution mapping to
the query in Listing 3.2, but is willing to add an additional $0.10 if all triples originate
from a reliable source. In this case, every solution mapping to the query in Listing 3.2 has
a value of $0.25, if at least one of the sources is not considered reliable by the user, and
a value of $0.35, if all sources are considered reliable.
In Section 3.7 we will compare diﬀerent allocation rules and show under which cir-
cumstances which of them should be preferred.
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3.6.1 Integer Programming Allocation Rule
The Integer Programming Allocation Rule maximizes the customer's utility given a cus-
tomer's query q, the valuation function V (·), the prices pi1, . . . , pin, and the budget con-
straint s. Hence, the allocation rule describes an optimization problem. We will now show
how we can express this optimization problem as an Integer Programming Problem:
Let τj ∈ {0, 1} with j ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a binary variable indicating whether the triple
tj is bought, pij the price associated with buying the triple, ri ∈ {0, 1} with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
a binary variable indicating whether the solution mapping ωi can be obtained from the
current allocation of triples, where k is the number of all possible solution mappings, and
vi := v(ωi) the value for the solution mapping ωi. Let further s be the budget of the
customer which acts as a cap on the total payment.
The objective is to ﬁnd values for τ1, . . . , τn and r1, . . . , rk which maximizes the utility
u(τ1, . . . , τn, r1, . . . , rk), that is the sum of the values of the allocated solution mappings
minus the price of the necessary triples:
u(τ1, . . . , τn, r1, . . . , rk) =
(
k∑
j=1
rj · vj
)
−
(
n∑
i=1
τi · pii
)
(1)
In addition to the objective, we also have constraints which have to be respected by
the solution of the Integer Programming Problem.
The ﬁrst constraint is that for a solution mapping ωj ∈ Ω all the nj = |Ij| relevant
triples {ti | i ∈ Ij} have to be allocated to include that solution mapping into the alloca-
tion, where Ij is the index set of the indices of the relevant triples. This means that the
binary variable rj can only be set to one when all the variables τi with i ∈ Ij are set to
one. We can enforce this with the following linear constraint:
∑
i∈Ij
τi − nj · rj ≥ 0 (2)
It is possible that multiple data products oﬀer the same triple, in this case, only the
cheapest triple will be considered. If multiple data products oﬀer the same triple at the
same price, one of the triples is randomly chosen as the relevant triple.
The second constraint is that the price of the allocation does not exceed the budget s:
n∑
i=1
τi · pii ≤ s (3)
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Equations 4 show the general form of the Integer Program for this optimization prob-
lem:
Objective: max
(
k∑
j=1
rj · vj −
n∑
i=1
τi · pii
)
(4)
Subject to:
∑
i∈I1
τi − n1 · r1 ≥ 0
...∑
i∈Ik
τi − nk · rk ≥ 0
n∑
i=1
τi · pii ≤ s
Bounds: r1, . . . , rk ∈ {0, 1}
τ1, . . . , τn ∈ {0, 1}
In Example 5 we show how such an Integer Programming Problem for our scenario
could look like.
Example 5. We extend Example 4 by assuming that provider PA can contribute triples
t1, . . . , t5, provider PB triples t6, . . . , t17, and provider PC triples t18, . . . , t25. Further, as-
sume that the query answer consists of the solution mappings with their respective value
according to Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Solution mappings, their required triples, and the value.
Solution Mapping Triples Value
ρ1 t1, t6, t7, t8, t9 $0.25
ρ2 t2, t10, t11, t12, t14 $0.35
ρ3 t3, t14, t15, t16, t17 $0.35
ρ4 t4, t18, t19, t20, t21 $0.35
ρ5 t5, t22, t23, t24, t25 $0.25
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In this case, the Integer Programming Problem has the following form:
Objective: max($0.25 · (r1 + r5) (5)
+ $0.35 · (r2 + r3 + r4)
− $0.10 · (τ1 + · · ·+ τ5)
− $0.02 · (τ6 + · · ·+ τ17)
− $0.03 · (τ18 + · · ·+ τ25))
Subject to: τ1 + τ6 + τ7 + τ8 + τ9 − 5 · r1 ≥ 0
τ2 + τ10 + τ11 + τ12 + τ13 − 5 · r2 ≥ 0
τ3 + τ14 + τ15 + τ16 + τ17 − 5 · r3 ≥ 0
τ4 + τ18 + τ19 + τ20 + τ21 − 5 · r4 ≥ 0
τ5 + τ22 + τ23 + τ24 + τ25 − 5 · r5 ≥ 0
$0.10 · (τ1 + · · ·+ τ5)
+ $0.02 · (τ6 + · · ·+ τ17)
+ $0.03 · (τ18 + · · ·+ τ25) ≤ $0.65
Bounds: r1, . . . , r5 ∈ {0, 1}
τ1, . . . , τ25 ∈ {0, 1}
The two big advantages of the Integer Programming Allocation Rule are that (1) it can
be solved using standard optimization tools which are specialized in such problems and
(2) the allocation found by this rule is optimal: a customer cannot gain more utility by any
other allocation, given the valuation and prices. However, the allocation rule also has also
a disadvantage: Solving the Integer Programming Problem is NP-hard, which means that
the Integer Programming Allocation Rule has a limited scalability. We will investigate the
runtime needed to solve the problem in Section 3.7. Another drawback of this allocation
rule is that it is limited to a linear valuation of the allocation. As soon as the value for a
single solution mapping is not constantthis can happen for example if the customer has
a decreasing marginal value for the solution mappingsthe optimization cannot anymore
be formulated as an Integer Programming Problem and the solving tools cannot be used.
Given this drawback, we present another allocation rule which will complement the Integer
Programming Allocation Rule.
3.6.2 Greedy Allocation Rule
The Greedy Allocation Rule tries, as the name suggests, to ﬁnd a good allocation in a
greedy fashion. Hence, the allocation rule does not guarantee that the found allocation is
optimal in the sense that it maximizes the customer's utility. The upside of this allocation
rule is that (1) it scales better with increasing number of solution mappings which can
be allocated, which means it remains feasible in situations where the NP-hard Integer
Programming Allocation Rule is not anymore feasible, and (2) the allocation rule is com-
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patible with any valuation which is monotonic decreasing. Note that the valuation does
not have to be strictly monotonic decreasing but can also be linear.
The idea of the Greedy Allocation Rule is quite simple: Choose the non-allocated
solution mapping with the highest ratio between utility and price and allocate it, as long
as the utility is positive (the value is higher than the price) and the sum of the price
of all allocated solution mappings is smaller than or equal to the budget. Whenever a
new solution mapping is allocated, the utility of the remaining non-allocated solution
mappings must be updated. This is because an allocated solution mapping might include
some triples of the non-allocated solution mappings, in which case the speciﬁc triples do
not have to be bought again and the price for the respective solution mappings decreases.
Algorithm 3.1 shows how the Greedy Allocation rule can be implemented. First, the
algorithm initializes the set I with the indices of all solution mappings, the set Tbuy for
the indices of all triples which need to be bought, the allocation a, and the total price Π
of allocation a (Line 14). Then, the algorithm enters a loop and determines the solution
mapping with the highest ratio between utility and price. For this, the algorithm has to
get the indices of those triples which are relevant for a speciﬁc solution mapping ωi. This
information is provided by the function relevantTriplesIndices (Line 7). Afterwards, the
indices of those triples which are already considered for buying are removed from Tbuy
(Line 8), because the same triple does not need to be bought twice by the customer. Using
the indices of the required triples, the price Πi (Line 9), the utility ui (Line 10), and the
ratio ri (Line 11) can be calculated. With this information, the algorithm can determine
the index max of the solution mapping with the highest ratio having a price which is still
in the budget b and a utility of at least 0 (Line 12). If there is still a solution mapping
that reaches these conditions (Line 13), the total price Π, the allocation a, the index set
I with all available solution mappings for allocation, and the index set of all triples to be
bought Tbuy are updated accordingly (Line 1417). If there is no suitable solution mapping
or simply no solution mapping at all left, the algorithm stops the loop and returns the
allocation a and the total price Π (Line 1819).
The allocation rule runs in O(n2 log(n)) time, where n is the number of solution
mappings available: For each (at most n) new allocated solution mapping, the algorithm
has to sort the remaining non-allocated solution mappings (O(n log(n))) to determine the
one with the highest utility.
3.7 Evaluation
To empirically compare the presented allocation rules, we measure runtime and utility
for diﬀerent queries. The ﬁrst measure, runtime, is chosen to establish that the use of our
proposed method is feasible and practical in a WoD setting from a computational point
of view. The second metric, utility, indicates that the results are desirable and how close
the greedy rule approaches the optimal.
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Algorithm 3.1 Algorithm for the Greedy Allocation Rule.
Data: Solutions ω1, . . . , ωn, values v1, . . . , vn, prices pi1, . . . , pik, budget b
Result: Allocation a, Payment Π
1 I ← {1, . . . , n}
2 Tbuy ← ∅
3 a ← ∅
4 Π ← 0
5 do
6 for i ∈ I do
7 Trelevant ← relevantTriplesIndices(ωi)
8 Trequired ← Trelevant \ Tbuy
9 Πi ←
∑
j∈Trequired
pij
10 ui ← vi − Πi
11 ri ← uiΠi
12 max ← argmaxi∈{1,...,n}({ri|Π + Πi ≤ b and ui ≥ 0})
13 if ∃max then
14 Π ← Π + Πmax
15 a ← a ∪ {ωmax}
16 I ← I \ {i}
17 Tbuy ← Tbuy ∪ Trelevant
18 while ∃max and I 6= ∅
19 return a, Π
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Table 3.4: Number of solution mappings and triple per solution mapping.
Query Solution Mappings Triples per Solution Mapping
CD1 90 12
CD6 11 4
LD1 308 3
LD2 185 3
LD3 159 4
LD4 50 5
LD5 28 3
LD6 39 5
LD7 1216 2
LD8 22 5
LD11 376 5
LS1 1159 1
LS2 333 12
LS3 9054 5
LS5 393 6
LS6 28 5
LS7 144 45
3.7.1 Evaluation Setup
We use two diﬀerent scenarios: one based on the FedBench benchmark and a new, synthetic
scenario.
FedBench Scenario: The goal of this ﬁrst scenario is to evaluate our procedure in
a well-established realistic setting. FedBench [Schmidt et al., 2011] consists of 9 datasets
on various topics and 25 SPARQL queries. We excluded queries with only 1, 2, or 3
solution mappings, as their allocation would be rather trivial. This left us with 17 queries.
The number of solution mappings range from 11 to 9054 per query. Table 3.4 shows the
number of solution mappings and triples per solution mapping for each of the 17 selected
FedBench queries.
Synthetic Scenario: The goal of this second scenario is to evaluate the scaling be-
havior of the allocation procedure whilst varying both the number of solution mappings
per query answer and the number of unique triples contained therein. To that end we
generated hypothetical queries that have randomly generated query answers (as we only
require the answer sets for evaluating the allocation procedure). The number of solution
mappings s per answer varies between 50 and 1000. Each solution mapping consists of 5
triples, hence we have n = 5s triples in an answer. To simulate the diversity of an answer,
we introduce the parameter d ∈ [0, 1], which speciﬁes how many unique triples are con-
tained in a query answer. Next, we randomly assign each triple one of nunique = 1+d·(n−1)
identiﬁers. The result is an answer set in which all triples are the same for d = 0 and each
triple in the query answer is unique for d = 1. This procedure generates query answers of
varying size s and number of unique triples nunique.
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Parameters: We set the price for each triple to a uniformly distributed random
number between $0.00 and $1.00. The number of triples per solution mapping multiplied
by a uniformly distributed random number between $1.00 and $2.00 gives us the value
for each solution mapping. The budget for each query is set such that only 50% of the
solution mappings can be obtained. Using these numbers ensures that (1) there is at least
one aﬀordable allocation having positive utility and (2) not all solution mappings can
be allocated. This guarantees that the allocation problem does not become trivial to solve.
3.7.2 Results
We discuss both scenarios in turn.
FedBench Scenario: Fig. 3.4 graphs the execution time for the 17 selected FedBench
queries for the Integer Rule and the Greedy Rule in seconds. It shows that the Integer
Allocation Rule is by orders magnitude slower than the Greedy Allocation Rule for most
queries. One exception is query LS3, which actually has a longer runtime for the Greedy
Rule. LS3 is also the query with the highest number of solution mappings. One explanation
is the high diversity in a large number of solution mappings that beneﬁts the integer
approach.
The ratio between the utility of the Greedy Rule and the Integer Rule for the 17
selected FedBench queries is graphed in Fig. 3.5. The graph shows that the Greedy Rule
has a utility which is very close to the Integer Rule, which maximizes utility given the
prices and values. The evaluation shows that for the FedBench queries, the Greedy Rule
provides allocations of comparable quality to the Integer Rule in orders of magnitude
smaller time.
CD1 CD6 LD1 LD2 LD3 LD4 LD5 LD6 LD7 LD8 LD11 LS1 LS2 LS3 LS5 LS6 LS7
Integer 29.74 17.12 25.32 16.13 30.67 28.40 16.27 17.63 9.54 18.61 21.20 13.64 25.00 20.94 32.15 17.97 19.58
Greedy 0.008 0.004 0.129 0.049 0.060 0.005 0.006 0.004 1.703 0.008 0.307 1.123 0.065 38.95 0.151 0.004 0.025
Solutions 90 11 308 185 159 50 28 39 1216 22 376 1159 333 9054 393 28 144
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Fig. 3.4: Runtime in seconds for the Integer Programming Allocation Rule (Integer) and
the Greedy Allocation Rule (Greedy) for the FedBench benchmark.
Synthetic Scenario: We will now focus on the scaling behavior of both allocation
rules. Fig. 3.6 shows how the Integer Programming Allocation Rule scales with respect
to the diversity d for diﬀerent number of solution mappings. Note that the runtime is
plotted in a logarithmic scale and that we plot with respect to d and not nunique, as the
latter is dependent on s. For this evaluation, we used our own synthetic data as described
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CD1 CD6 LD1 LD2 LD3 LD4 LD5 LD6 LD7 LD8 LD11 LS1 LS2 LS3 LS5 LS6 LS7
Ratio 0.997 0.973 0.952 0.985 0.955 0.994 0.998 0.85 1 0.901 0.985 1 0.967 0.997 0.985 0.997 0.798
Integer 54.85 35.63 775.4 530.2 686.6 238.6 59.51 96.69 2017 70.77 1591 956.7 208.3 41059 1768 109.5 408.2
Greedy 54.67 34.67 738.2 522.5 655.4 237.3 59.41 82.17 2016 63.79 1566 956.3 201.5 40921 1742 109.2 325.9
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Fig. 3.5: Ratio between the utility of the Greedy Allocation Rule (Greedy) and the Integer
Programming Allocation Rule (Integer) for the FedBench benchmark.
above. For some plots, the graph has some missing points. The missing points indicate
parameter combinations that did not yield results within 12 hours of optimization. As
the ﬁgure shows, the runtime complexity explodes if the diversity is in the lower third of
the spectrum and the number of solution mappings is high enough. For a diversity of 0,
the allocation problem becomes trivial as there is only one triple which can be chosen.
For a diversity of 1, the diﬀerent solution mappings in a query answer are independent,
meaning that they do not share any triples. Also, in this case, the allocation problem
seems to be simpler to solve, although not as simple as when the diversity is 0. For a
diversity in between 0 and 1, the allocation problem becomes harder. This is because the
solution mappings are now more dependent on each other because they share triples: some
combinations of solution mappings will be much cheaper than other combinations, because
they can exploit the fact that they share some triples and their prices. Interestingly, the
less the diversity is, the more time the Integer Programming Allocation Rule needs to
solve the allocation problem. At least, until the diversity gets close to 0, at which point
the number of triples is very low and the allocation problem becomes much easier.
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Fig. 3.6: Runtime in seconds (on a logarithmic scale) for the Integer Programming Allo-
cation Rule for diﬀerent diversities and query answer sizes.
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The scaling behavior of the Greedy Allocation Rule with respect to the diversity
d for diﬀerent number of solution mappings is shown in Fig. 3.7. The plot uses the
same scale as in Fig. 3.6 to make it easier to compare the results. As Fig. 3.7 indicates,
the runtime for the Greedy Allocation Rule does not suﬀer from the same explosion of
runtime as the Integer Programming Allocation Rule when the diversity is low. The
reason for this is quite simple: the Greedy Rule does have to consider which combination
of solution mapping could exploit the overlap of triples the most. Instead, the allocation
rule just chooses the next best solution mapping and updates the prices, accordingly.
Nevertheless, we can observe some trend that the runtime is higher for lower diversity
than it is for high diversities or a diversity of 0. This can be explained by considering
how much the Greedy Allocation Rule has to resort the solution mappings after each
step. If the diversity is high, there are only few solution mappings for which the price
changes after a solution mapping is selected. Hence, the resorting can be done faster. If
the diversity is low, however, selecting a solution mapping does impact more remaining
solution mappings, due to the increased overlap. Hence, the resorting takes more time.
Eventually, for a diversity of 0, after selecting the ﬁrst solution mapping all other solution
mappingss have a price of 0 (because they all need the same triple which is already
bought), which means that no resorting at all is needed.
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Fig. 3.7: Runtime in seconds (on a logarithmic scale) for the Greedy Allocation Rule for
diﬀerent diversities and query answer sizes.
As our evaluation shows, the runtime of the Integer Rule depends highly on the di-
versity of the triples within a query answer. Hence, even a query answer with a lot of
solution mappings can be feasible for the Integer Rule whereas another query answer
with fewer solution mappings might not be feasible. The Greedy Rule behaves more sta-
ble with changing diversity. Paired with our observations about the utility of resulting
solution mappings in the FedBench scenario, we can infer that the Greedy approach seems
to provide good allocations within reasonable time bounds for realistic scenarios.
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3.8 Limitations and Conclusions
To grow further and be able to serve as a high-quality data source, the WoD has to
ﬁnd the means to fund the creation, serving, and maintenance of data sources. In this
paper, we proposed a new paradigm for funding these activities in the form of a market
for data that combines a market-based approach with principles of federated querying.
We presented FedMark, a prototype that implements the concepts we introduced in this
paper. In addition, we introduced two possible allocation rules which can be used by
a customer to decide for a speciﬁc allocation. As we have seen, both allocation rules
have diﬀerent properties with respect to runtime and utility. While the Integer Allocation
Rule guarantees an optimal allocation with respect to utility, the runtime of this rule
can exceed any reasonable time limit under certain condition, as we have seen in the
evaluation section. The Greedy Allocation Rule does not suﬀer from extensive runtimes
in the scenarios we investigated. However, the Greedy Rule cannot guarantee an optimal
allocation. Although, we have seen that the utility is often very close to an optimal
allocation. In practice, a customer would be advised to run both allocation rules in parallel
and specify a time out. After the time runs out, the customer can check whether the Integer
Allocation Rule has found an optimal allocation. If not, the current best solution of the
Integer Allocation Rule can be compared to the outcome of the Greedy Rule. Whichever
rule produces the best result under the time constraints should be picked by the customer.
Another advantage of the Greedy Rule is that it can handle decreasing marginal values
for the solutions. If the customer's valuation is not linear, he might not have any other
choice but to use the Greedy Rule. Obviously, we need to explore a set of other allocation
rules to understand the trade-oﬀs for the various diﬀerent valuation needs of the customer.
In addition, we need to revisit our assumptions and check if they are truly realistic.
As an example, consider the assumption that providers can amortize their ﬁxed costs
over many transactions. This is only true if their goods are actually suﬃciently attractive
to be bought, which again depends on the competitiveness of the marketplace. Whilst
we believe that this is true for many data products (e.g., ﬁnancial data) we will have
to investigate where this assumption does not hold. Second, this paper did not discuss
how a provider decides on the optimal pricing. Whilst we did run an analysis indicating
that it is favorable for a provider to learn the price, we did not evaluate how well that
price can be learneda task for future work. Third, we need to explore the possibility
of selling query subscriptions, which opens the way to mechanisms akin to the ones that
are currently dominating the entertainment industry. Fourth, we need to explore market-
aware optimizations for FedMark and evaluate their inﬂuence on the speed of query
execution. Finally, the generalizability of our evaluation might be hampered by the use of
FedBench. Indeed, FedBench's limitations led us to run a second evaluation with synthetic
data. Whilst an evaluation in additional real-world scenarios is desirable and should be
subject of future work, we believe that our evaluation highlights the key properties of our
allocation rules and, hence, establishes their applicability.
Whatever the shortcomings of FedMark and our concept, we believe that the contri-
butions of this paper are a ﬁrst step in the principled exploration of a ﬁnancially stable
and, therefore, sustainable Web of Data.
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Abstract. The World Wide Web is a massive network of interlinked documents. One of the reasons
the World Wide Web is so successful is the fact that most content is available free of any charge.
Inspired by the success of the World Wide Web, the Web of Data applies the same strategy of
interlinking to data. To this point, most of data in the Web of Data is also free of charge. The fact
that the data is freely available raises the question of ﬁnancing these services, however. As we will
discuss in this paper, advertisement and donations cannot easily be applied to this new setting.
To create incentives to subsidize data providers, we propose that sponsors should pay the providers
to promote sponsored data. In return, sponsored data will be privileged over non-sponsored data.
Since it is not possible to enforce a certain ordering on the data the user will receive, we propose to
split up the data into diﬀerent batches and deliver these batches with diﬀerent delays. In this way,
we can privilege sponsored data without withholding any non-sponsored data from the user.
In this paper, we introduce a new concept of a delayed-answer auction, where sponsors can pay
to prioritize their data. We introduce a new model which captures the particular situation when
a user access data in the Web of Data. We show how the weighted Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
mechanism can be applied to our scenario and we discuss how certain parameters can inﬂuence the
nature of our auction. With our new concept, we build a ﬁrst step to a free yet ﬁnancial sustainable
Web of Data.
4.1 Introduction
The Web of Data (WoD) is the result of applying the principle of interlinking documents,
which fueled to growth of the World Wide Web, to data, which results in so called Linked
Data. Like in its predecessor, the WWW, most content of the WoD is to date free of any
charge. Allowing users to access Linked Data for free introduces new challenges when it
comes to ﬁnancing these services. The question we are answering in this paper is: How
can the WoD be free and ﬁnancially sustainable at the same time?
The World Wide Web is not only the inspiration of the Web of Data but also serves as
an example of how to ﬁnance such services. Hence, it is natural to think about applying
the techniques which ﬁnance the WWW to the WoD. One of the biggest ﬁnancial motors
of the WWW is advertisement. What made advertisement in the WWW more eﬃcient
than in other medias is the fact that advertisement in the WWW is customized to the
user. Hence, it is easier for advertisers to target a speciﬁc user group. This customization
is mainly achieved either by showing an ad based on a keyword entered in a search page or
by embedding ads which are related to a certain webpage's content. Unfortunately, these
techniques do not apply that easily to the WoD. The main problem of the WoD with
respect to advertisement is that the data provider has no inﬂuence on how the content is
presented to the user: In the WWW, advertisement can be added to the presentation of
the content at the discretion of the data provider. In the WoD, however, a user receives the
data in a structured format. This structured format allows algorithms to automatically
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process the data further, if needed, and does not provide the means to add any additional
advertisements. Accessing the WoD from a user's perspective is more similar to accessing
a database than accessing a website's content.
Donations could be an alternative to ﬁnancing the WoD. Wikipedia is an example of a
content provider in the WWW which is ﬁnanced by donations. However, a signiﬁcant part
of the users is not aware that there is a possibility to donate to Wikipedia or do not know
how to donate [Glott et al., 2010]. Such a lack of awareness for the need of donations will
be even more pronounced in the WoD. Users in the WoD often access a lot of datasets
at the same time. Sometimes these datasets are part of a federation and can be accessed
transparently through a single accessing point. Very often, a user might simply not be
aware of using a certain dataset let alone realizing that the provider requires ﬁnancial
support through donations.
To remedy this situation, we propose that sponsors who are interested in promoting
certain data will subsidize all data provider which are involved in creating the speciﬁc
solution containing the subsidized data. A sponsor can be anybody who gains an advantage
if certain data is distributed to as much users as possible. However, this means that we
need a way to privilege highly sponsored over less sponsored or non-sponsored data.
In the WWW, search engines, for example, can change the ordering of search results to
privilege certain websites and order advertisements on the search result page based on the
payments. In the WoD, the query language SPARQL [Harris and Seaborne, 2013] which
is used to query the desired data allows a user to specify the ordering of the received
data. Even if we disable such a functionality, the structured format in which the data is
delivered easily allows a user, or the program which is querying on behalf the user, to
reorder the received data ad libitum. This means that it is not possible to force a certain
ranking of the received data upon the user within a single query answer. One alternative is
to simply deliver only part of the available data and withhold the rest. Data would then be
delivered or not based on the amount of sponsorship the data received. This would create
a situation where diﬀerent sponsors compete to be part of the delivered data. Whereas
such a situation would create enough competition between sponsors to ensure a certain
revenue, it opposes the idea that all data should be freely available. Hence, we propose
a new concept where the requested data is delayed depending on how much a certain
sponsor is willing to pay for its data being privileged over the data of other sponsors. Our
new concept is aligned with the idea that all data is freely available but creates at the
same time an incentive for sponsors to promote certain data. The revenue generated by
our concepts can be used to ﬁnance the providers which are responsible for hosting and
maintaining the data.
By delaying part of the data requested by a user, we are harming the user's experience
to a certain degree. Obviously, a user would prefer to get all requested data immediately
instead of receiving the data in consecutively delayed batches. We discuss the user's ex-
perience in detail in Section 4.6.3. In addition, a user would prefer to receive data in an
unbiased way instead of receiving ﬁrst the data which received the highest sponsoring. To
remedy this problem, we introduce an extension to our model in Section 4.7 where part
of the data is randomly assigned to batches.
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The contributions of our paper are: (1) we introduce our new concept of a delayed-
answer auction where sponsors can pay to have sponsored data delivered quicker to the
user, (2) we introduce a new link selection model (akin to click models in the WWW)
which captures the probability that a user selects a link contained in a certain solution,
(3) we show how the weighted VCG auction mechanism can be applied to our scenario and
we discuss how certain parameters of the auction can inﬂuence the nature of our auction,
and (4) we discuss an extension to our model where only part of the data delivery is
inﬂuenced by the sponsors.
4.2 Motivation
Imagine a user who wants to make a reservation for a restaurant in Zurich, having a
rating of at least 8.0, and which is oﬀering traditional food. Such a user can use the query
language SPARQL [Harris and Seaborne, 2013] to express the exact needs. Compared to
a keyword based searched in the WWW, such a semantic search is much more precise
when it comes to expressing which data the user actually wants. Listing 4.1 shows how a
SPARQL query for our example could look like.
Listing 4.1: A query which asks for traditional restaurants in Zurich with a ranking of
at least 8.0.
SELECT ?name ?link
WHERE {
?restaurant :City ex:Zurich .
?restaurant :Food_Style :Traditional .
?restaurant :Reservation_Link ?link .
?restuarant :ranking ?rank . FILTER(?rank >= 8) }
The user issuing the SPARQL query from Listing 4.1 has an incentive to make a
reservation for a restaurant with the desired properties as quick and straightforward as
possible. Meanwhile, the diﬀerent restaurants have an incentive that the user makes the
reservation at their own restaurant and not at the competition. Assume now that the
diﬀerent solutions for the query arrive at the user with diﬀerent delays, e.g., the ﬁrst
solution will appear immediately, the second solution after a few seconds, the third solution
even a few seconds later, and so on. It is not hard to imagine that the user would not
wait an hour for all thousands of solutions to appear. Instead, a user would probably only
wait a few seconds before picking one of the already available solutions and make the
reservation. Indeed, as [Lohr, 2012] implied, users become very inpatient over time and
even a delay of 250ms can inﬂuence a user to visit a website of a close competitor. Similar,
[Hamilton, 2009] argue how important latency is for the user's experience of a website.
An experiment at Amazon showed that a delay of 100ms resulted in sale decrease of 1%
[Kohavi et al., 2009]. Also, an experiment at Google showed that if the time to display
search results is increased by 500ms, the revenue is reduced by 20% [Kohavi et al., 2009].
Finally, experiments at Microsoft Live Search showed that when the research result page
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is slowed down by a second, ad clicks per user decline by 1.5%, and even by 4.4% when
the delay is two seconds [Kohavi et al., 2009].
Based on these ﬁndings, we developed a model for delaying solutions for SPARQL
query answers where sponsors can pay money to prioritize certain solutions and delay
others. Using this strategy of delaying part of the query answer, we manage to discriminate
diﬀerent solutions. Similar to a user clicking on a link in the WWW, a user (or program
acting on behalf of a user) can decide to look up a certain URI contained in a solution
for a query answer. A sponsor is motivated to pay money whenever such a URI lookup
directs the user to some service. In our example, the oﬀered service could be a reservation
system for the respective restaurant. We will denote URIs which direct a user to some
service as service link, or just link, to distinguish it from other URIs. Depending on how
much a sponsor is willing to pay for a visited service link, a solution containing that link
might be more or less prioritized. If a user looks up a service link, all the data provider
involved in creating the speciﬁc solution will receive a share of the money the sponsor is
paying. In particular, the provider oﬀering the rankings of diﬀerent restaurants gets paid
for its service.
In Section 4.4 we discuss our concept of delaying solutions in more detail and in Section
4.5 we introduce a formal model for our concept. Note that our model is targeted at query
answers for which a delay inﬂuences the likelihood that the user will consider a certain
solution. This is not always the case. For some queries, a user does not mind waiting a
long time receiving an answer. Hence, it is important to keep in mind that our concept is
speciﬁcally designed for situations were such delays do matter.
4.3 Related Work
Auctions for Sponsored Search Results: Before Google introduced the Generalized
Second Price (GSP) auction in 2002, ﬁrst price models were used for selling ads on search
result pages [Wilkens et al., 2017]. The idea of the GSP auction is that each bidder submits
one bid, which indicates the bidders value for a click. Diﬀerent positions (or slots) on the
search result page will have diﬀerent click-through rates. Hence, the bidders value per click
translates into a value per slot. Depending on the auctioneer, diﬀerent ads might have
diﬀerent click-through rates for the same slot, adding an additional layer of complexity.
In the simplest variation of the GSP auction, the ﬁrst slot is given to the bidder declaring
the highest value, the second slot to the bidder with the next highest value, and so on.
What gives the name to the GSP auction is the fact that each bidder pays a price which
equals the value of the next lowest bidder, also known as the second price. [Edelman et al.,
2007]
The advantage of the GSP auction over ﬁrst price models is that the GSP auction pre-
vents cycling patterns, a situation where prices gradually rise until a sudden drop occurs
and the pattern starts over [Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007]. Shortly after Google imple-
mented the GSP auction, one of their engineers realized that a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction [Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961] could also be implemented to
sell ad positions on their search results pages. The advantage of the VCG auction is that
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it is truthful, which means that each bidder has an incentive to report their true value
as bid. Google refrained from replacing the GSP with the VCG auction because the GSP
auction was already growing attention and there would have been additional eﬀort in-
volved, both on the side of Google and the sellers, to change to the VCG auction. [Varian
and Harris, 2014]
In [Aggarwal et al., 2007], Aggarwal et al. propose a position-based auctions mechanism
where bidders can impose additional constraints on the positions they want their ad to
appear. The motivation behind this auction format is that a bidder might have a value if
the ad just appears at the top of a search result page, even if the user does not click the
ad, because the mere appearance of the ad increases the visibility of the brand.
In the WoD setting, it is unclear which of these auctions are applicable. In section
4.5.3 we will show how the VCG auction mechanism can be applied to our setting.
Click Models for Web Search and Sponsored Search Auctions: Both web search
and sponsored search auctions need click models for estimating how likely a user would
select a certain search result or a certain ad. Hence, the diﬀerent models used in these
two ﬁelds are often overlapping and can often be used in the other ﬁeld.
The simplest models for user clicks on advertisements is based on the assumption that
click-through rates can be separated into two factors: one factor which is only inﬂuenced
by the ad which wins the slot and one factor which is only inﬂuenced by the slot position
itself. The result of this assumption, called the separability assumption, is that the click-
through rate of a certain ad winning a certain slot can be computed by just multiplying
these two factors, without having to consider which ads are winning all the other slots.
In settings where the click-through rates are not separable, a weighted VCG mechanism
may not apply. [Aggarwal et al., 2006]
The click model of [Richardson et al., 2007] provides one example of such separable
factors: the inﬂuence of the slot is described as the probability that a user sees an ad at a
speciﬁc position. The inﬂuence of the ad is described as the probability that the user clicks
on the ad given that the user saw the ad. Note that it is assumed that those probabilities
are independent of the ads already shown to the user.
Aggarwal et al. [Aggarwal et al., 2008] introduce a Markovian user model where the
user scans a list of ads and makes a decision whether to (1) click on the ad, (2) continue
scanning the list, or (3) abort the inspections of the ads. Note that in this model, the
probability that a user clicks on a certain ad does not only depend on the ad itself and
the position but also on the ads placed in higher slots. Hence, the separability assumption
does not hold anymore in this model. A consequence of this is that the GSP allocation
of ads is not anymore the most eﬃcient allocation [Aggarwal et al., 2008]. Similar to the
model of [Aggarwal et al., 2008], [Craswell et al., 2008] introduces a cascading model for
search results where each document is either clicked or skipped. In the latter case, the
user continues the scanning of the list of results.
One drawback of the models of [Aggarwal et al., 2008] and [Craswell et al., 2008] is
that it is assumed that a user will only continue scanning the ads/search results if no
previous ad/search result has been clicked, yet, and hence, assuming that the user will
click at most on one ad/search result during the scanning process. [Guo et al., 2009]
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introduced the dependent click model which extends the cascading model by introducing
conditional probabilities of a user to continue scanning the list of results depending on
whether a click occurred on the current document or not and hence, allowing for multiple
clicks within a single scanning process.
In [Zhu et al., 2010], Zhu et al. introduce their General Click Model which is a more
general model for user clicks. Most existing models can be considered a special case of
their general model and they showed, for example, that the models of [Richardson et al.,
2007] and [Craswell et al., 2008] can be modelled using their General Click Model.
As described in Section 4.2, a user (or program) can visit certain service links, which
are URIs which direct the user to some service. Selecting such a service link is very similar
to a user clicking on a link in the WWW. However, despite the variety of click models for
web search and sponsored search auctions, none of them captures the situation when a
user selects a service link from a set of solutions for a SPARQL query. Hence, in Section
4.5.1 we introduce a new selection model which we designed especially for SPARQL query
answers.
4.4 Delayed-Answer Auction
In this section, we introduce our concept of a delayed-answer auction. At the core of our
concept lies the ability of sponsors to pay money if a user follows a certain service link
contained in a query solution. The data is accessible in form of a SPARQL endpoint. Our
auction mechanism makes sure that solutions containing links with higher bids appear
with a smaller delay than solutions containing links with lower bids. Hence, our auction
mechanism creates a ranking of the solutions by introducing diﬀerent delays for them.
The user who poses the SPARQL query and the data providers which oﬀer the data
needed to answer the query deﬁne the context of our auction. Given this context, the
sponsors are the participants (or bidder) in the auction. Hence, we will use the expressions
sponsor and bidder interchangeably. The bidders place a bid on a speciﬁc link contained
in a query solution. This bid indicates how much the sponsor is willing to pay if the user
visits a certain service link. We call a service link which has a bid placed on it a sponsored
link.
In our concept, we make the simplifying assumption that each solution contains at most
one sponsored link. This means that each solution can be associated with one sponsor and
one bid. If nobody is bidding on a link contained in a solution or the solution contains
no link at all, the bid is set to 0. We discuss the more general case when there might be
multiple sponsored links in a single solution in the limitations in Section 4.8. If a user
visits a link contained in a solution for a query answer, the visit of the service link is
registered at the auctioneer and the placed bid is charged to the respective bidder. The
revenue generated by the auction is used to ﬁnance all the entities involved in providing
the data which were needed to create the solutions for the query answer.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the process of our delayed-answer auction concept. A user submits
a query to the auction. The auction executes the query and generates the query answer.
Parts of the query answer get delayed, depending on how much the sponsors bid on certain
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links contained in the solutions. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the money gets redistributed
by the auction to the providers which were involved in creating the query answer. The
service link which is visited directs the user to the auction which, in turn, redirects the
user to the appropriate location. This redirecting mechanism is important to keep track
of which links are visited.
Provider
RDF Data
Auction User
Provider
RDF Data
Sponsor
Delay
Delay
Delay
Query Answer
Bid Query
Query
Execution
Fig. 4.1: A user gets a delayed query answer based on the bids of sponsors.
To achieve the link redirection functionality, the auction has to replace each occurrence
of a sponsored link with a new link that directs the user to the auction when visited.
The auction has to track which link replacement corresponds to which original link and
redirect the user (or program), accordingly. The revenue generated by the auction is used
to ﬁnance the provider of the data. Not only the provider providing the sponsored link but
all providers providing any relevant data for the solution which contained the visited link
gets a share of the revenue. In addition, it is possible to use part of the revenue to subsidize
providers which were not so lucky and could not (or not enough) contribute to diﬀerent
sponsored links to cover the operation costs of their services. The exact distribution of the
revenue among the providers is beyond the scope of this paper, however. It is important
to note that for the auction to work properly, the providers and the auction need to build
a closed system, meaning that the providers' data are only accessible through the auction
itself and cannot be accessed directly by the user. If the providers and the auction would
not build a closed system, a user could circumvent the auction mechanism and directly
query the provider's data without suﬀering from the delays introduced by the auction.
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Fig. 4.2: If a user visits a link, the sponsor of that link pays the auction which distributes
the money among the providers.
Note that delaying certain solutions is not part of the standard SPARQL proto-
col [Feigenbaum et al., 2013]. Instead, the query answer must be oﬀered as a stream
of solutions. There are various extensions of SPARQL which oﬀer the possibility to re-
turn solutions in form of a stream [Anicic et al., 2011, Barbieri et al., 2010, Calbimonte
et al., 2010, Dell'Aglio et al., 2017, Le-Phuoc et al., 2011, Özçep et al., 2014, Rinne et al.,
2012]. A detailed discussion of the advantages or disadvantages of the diﬀerent streaming
solutions is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
4.5 Formal model
In this section, we introduce the formal model of our concept. First, we introduce our new
link selection model and then, we discuss the how this model can be applied to a weighted
VCG auction.
4.5.1 Batch Link Model
Our Batch Link Model diﬀers from traditional models for sponsored search results. In click
models for sponsored search results an ad is shown to a user if a bidder bids on a certain
keyword. This relevance of diﬀerent ads for a speciﬁc keyword can diﬀer quite a lot because
(1) the keyword entered by a user can be ambiguous or unspeciﬁc because of the lack of
any semantics and (2) an advertiser can decide to bid for a certain keyword, even if the
ad is not very relevant. In a semantic search, the ambiguity is mostly removed and, given
4.5 Formal model 79
that the user, or a program acting on behalf of the user, formulated the query diligently
enough, the lack of speciﬁcity as well. In addition, a bidder cannot force a certain service
link to be part of the query answer by increasing the bid enough. Instead, only links which
actually match the query are allowed to be in the query answer. Hence, in our model, we
assume that each service link i contained in a solution for a query answer has the same
probability prel of being relevant for the query. The probability prel depends on the query
the user issued and has to be estimated by the auction.
The model assumes that a user will select and visit only service links which are consid-
ered relevant for the query. In addition, a user will visit at most one link. The motivation
for this assumption is that, in contrast to advertisement in search result pages, a SPARQL
query returns the user exactly those links which are of interest for the user, due to the
nature of the semantic search. The user can judge the relevancy of the service link by
the information embedded in the solution which contains the link. This is diﬀerent from
a WWW search, where users often have to follow a link to discover whether the content
provided by the webpage is actually relevant.
If more than one service link is delivered, the user has to decide which of the relevant
links to select. Assume that there are n diﬀerent links, each having a probability of prel of
being relevant to the user. The probability that service link i is the only relevant link is:
prel · (1− prel)n−1 (1)
In this case, the user will visit this one link because it is to only one relevant.
However, there might be more than one relevant link. In case there are two relevant
service links, each relevant link has the same probability of being visited. Hence, the
probability the user will select service link i is half the probability that one of the two
relevant links is selected:
(prel)
2 · (1− prel)n−2
2
(2)
In total, there are (n− 1) cases having two relevant service links where one of them is
link i. In general, there are
(
n−1
k−1
)
cases having k relevant service links where one of them
is link i. If we combine all possible cases, we get the formula for the probability psel(n) of
a link i being selected:
Deﬁnition 1. Given n links with a probability of prel of being relevant to the user, we
deﬁne psel(n) as
psel(n) :=
n∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
· (prel)
j · (1− prel)n−j
j
(3)
Corollary 1.
psel(n) =
1− (1− prel)n
n
(4)
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Proof.
n∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
· (prel)
j · (1− prel)n−j
j
=
n∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
· n
j
· (prel)
j · (1− prel)n−j
n
=
n∑
j=1
(
n
j
) · (prel)j · (1− prel)n−j
n
=
(
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
) · (prel)j · (1− prel)n−j)− (1− prel)n
n
=
1− (1− prel)n
n
(5)
where the last equality holds because the sum in brackets is the distribution formula of
the binomial distribution.
Introducing delays into the delivery of results adds an additional layer of complexity
to our batch link model. Figure 4.3 shows an example of how the probability can decrease
over time. In this example, the ﬁrst batch is delivered in slightly less than 3 seconds
and the second one after almost 7 seconds. The probability that the user waits until the
ﬁrst batch of solutions arrives is around 55%. The probability that the user waits until
the second batch of solutions also arrives is around 25%. The probabilities ∆p1 and ∆p2
indicate how likely it is that the user stops waiting after receiving batch 1 and batch
2, respectively, and chooses one of the relevant links received. Let nj be the number of
solutions contained in batch j. We can now deﬁne the probability of a link inside a speciﬁc
batch being selected:
Deﬁnition 2. Let there be m batches containing n1, . . . , nm query solutions, each batch
j having a probability of ∆pj of being the last one received by the user. A link i contained
in batch b(i) has the following probability pseli of being selected by the user:
pseli :=
m∑
j=b(i)
∆pj · psel(Nj) , (6)
where Nj =
j∑
k=1
nk
We also deﬁne a probability ∆p0 which indicates the likelihood that the user does not
wait for the ﬁrst solution to arrive.
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Fig. 4.3: Probability that a user waits for the solutions to be delivered.
4.5.2 Ranking Function
To decide which solution should be placed in which batch, they have to be ranked ac-
cording to the bids placed on the links. There are two well-known ways of ranking the
links, either by ranking them by the bids placed on them or by their revenue, which is the
probability of being selected times the bid. Because of our assumption that the diﬀerent
links have the same probability of being relevant for the user, two diﬀerent links will have
the same probability of being selected for the same position in the ranking. In addition,
the probability of being selected is monotonically decreasing with respect to the position.
This means that ranking the links by bids results in the same ranking as ranking them
by revenue. Hence, we can just order the solutions by the bids they contain to achieve
a ranking by revenue. If two links receive the exact same bid, the ranking among the
solutions is determined randomly. Note that using a ranking function is not compatible
with a user speciﬁed order of the solutions and hence, ORDER-BY clauses in SPARQL
queries are not supported by our model.
After the solutions are ranked according to the bids on the links they contain, the
solutions can be assigned to the diﬀerent batches. Let nj the amount of solutions contained
in batch j. The ﬁrst n1 solutions will be assigned to the ﬁrst batch, the next n2 solutions
to the second batch, and so on. The parameters n1, . . . , nm as well as the delay of the
diﬀerent batches have to be determined in advance. The size of the diﬀerent batches and
the delays determine the probability for the diﬀerent service links of being selected.
82
4.5.3 Weighted VCG
We use the weighted VCG auction [Nisan and Ronen, 2007] to determine the prices the
diﬀerent bidders must pay for each visit by a user. We use this auction mechanism because
it is truthful, which means that the best strategy for each bidder in this auction is to place
a bid which equals their value for a visit by the user. The bidder's value for a visit is the
maximal amount the bidder would be willing to pay for a user's visit. Since the auction
is truthful, we will assume that the bidders are bidding their true value and we will use
the two expressions bid and value interchangeably.
The probabilities which are given by the batches, the delays, and the probability prel
are needed to calculate the prices the sponsors have to pay if the user visits a service link.
The VCG price pii for a link i is based on the harm the bidder imposes on all other
bidders. This harm can be calculated by the diﬀerence of the revenue all other bidders
would have if there were no bid on link i minus the revenue all other bidders have because
there is a bid on link i. The revenue of bidder i must be equal to this diﬀerence.
Deﬁnition 3. Given n links with probabilities psel1 , . . . , pseln and bids v1, . . . , vn. The
weighted VCG price pii for link i is:
pii :=
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
vj ·
(
p 63iselj − pselj
)
pseli
(7)
where p 63iselj denotes the probability of link j being visited if there were no bid on link i.
We show now how this price can be computed more eﬃciently. For this, we need the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4. For a link j in batch b(j), we deﬁne the 2nd value v2ndj as the highest bid
of the next batch b(j) + 1. If j is in the last batch bmax, we deﬁne the 2nd value to be 0:
v2ndj :=
{
max{vk : b(k) = b(j) + 1}, for j < bmax
0, for j = bmax
(8)
Intuitively, the 2nd value v2ndi is a lower bound for a bid v for staying in batch b(i).
As long as v > v2ndi , the link can stay in batch b(i). If v = v
2nd
i , it is not guaranteed that
link i stays in the same batch because the ranking among all links with the same value is
random. Finally, if v < v2ndi , the link ends up in a next higher batch.
Using this deﬁnition, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The weighted VCG price pii for a link i is given by:
pii =
m∑
j=b(i)
v2ndj ·∆pj · psel(Nj)
pseli
(9)
where m is the total number of batches.
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Proof. Equation 7 gives the general form of the weighted VCG price. The ﬁrst observation
is that p 63iselj = pselj for any link j which is positioned before link i, as their position does
not change when the bid on link i is removed. For any link j positioned after link i, the
probability p 63iselj changes only if link j ends up in a diﬀerent batch because of the removal
of the bid on link i.
There might be multiple service links which have a zero bid on them. Any change in
the rankings among links without any bid yields vj ·
(
p 63iselj − pselj
)
= 0 because vj = 0 and
hence, it does not aﬀect the price. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that
link i gets the last possible position in the ranking when the bid is removed.
If link i receives the last position, the link with the highest value in each batch between
b(i) and bmax ends up in a next lower batch. This means that vj ·
(
p 63iselj − pselj
)
can only
be non-zero if vj = v2ndb(j)−1 that is, if vj is the highest value inside its batch b(j) and hence,
the second value of the next higher batch. In these cases, the diﬀerence p 63iselj and pselj is
exactly:
∆pj · psel(Nj) (10)
by Equation 6. Hence:
n∑
j=1
l 6=i
vj ·
(
p 63iselj − pselj
)
=
m∑
j=b(i)
v2ndj ·∆pj · psel(Nj) (11)
4.6 Optimizing Batch Sizes and Delays
There are two sets of parameters we must control when setting up the delay auction: the
batch sizes n1, . . . , nm and their probabilities ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm.
Remember that we have a probability ∆p0 indicating how likely it is that the user
does not wait for the ﬁrst batch of solutions to arrive. The probability ∆p0 is given by the
user model and cannot be set by the auction designer. In addition, we set a threshold tmax
which indicates the maximal amount of time we are willing to let the user wait until the
last solution arrives. The threshold tmax maps to a probability pmax that the user waits
for the last batch to arrive.
Let there be n diﬀerent links. We have three constraints:
m∑
i=1
ni = n , (12)
m∑
i=1
∆pi = 1−∆p0 , (13)
and
∆pm ≥ pmax . (14)
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After the probabilities ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm are determined, the delays of the batches can be
chosen to match the desired probabilities.
Note that the parameters n1, . . . , nm and ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm cannot be decided ad hoc when
the bids are received. If one would try to optimize the parameters given the bids one would
render the auction untruthful despite the use of the weighted VCG mechanism. This is
because before the mechanism is applied, the bidders could manipulate the parameters
of the auction by manipulating their bids. Hence, the optimizations we discuss in this
section have to be done based on what values have to be expected coming up in future
auctions.
4.6.1 Optimizing Revenue
The revenue r generated by our auction mechanism is the sum of the VCG payments of all
sponsors involved in a speciﬁc query answer. As we showed in Section 4.5.3, the payments
can be calculated according to Equation 7. The total revenue generated by the auction is:
r =
n∑
i=1
pii · pseli (15)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=b(i)
v2ndj ·∆pj · psel(Nj)
If we concentrate ﬁrst on the best choice for the probabilities ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm, we see
that the revenue is a linear function with respect to those probabilities. This means that
the revenue is maximized when one of the probabilities is set to 1 and all others to 0. Let
∆pmax be the probability which maximizes the revenue when set to 1. If we also consider
the constraint in Equations 13 and 14, the revenue is maximized when ∆pmax = 1−∆p0
and ∆pm = pmax or, if max = m, ∆pmax = 1 −∆p0, respectively. All other probabilities
are set to 0. Setting ∆pj = 0 means that batch j has the same delay as the next batch
j + 1 and practically, they become one batch.
Optimizing the batch sizes is not as straightforward as optimizing the probabilities.
But, since there are at most two batches remaining after optimizing the probabilities, the
problem becomes easier. If max = m the revenue is 0, as there is only one batch and
hence, the second value is 0. If there are two batches left we redeﬁne the two remaining
probabilities as ∆p1 and ∆p2 and denote with n1 and n2 the number of solutions in the
two batches. We will denote the revenue when having only two batches as r∗:
r∗ =
n1∑
j=1
v2nd1 ·∆p1 ·
1− (1− prel)n1
n1
= v2nd1 · (1−∆p0 − pmax) · (1− (1− prel)n1) (16)
Note that the value v2nd1 depends on the choice of n1. The only way to optimize r
∗
is to iterate through all possible values of n1. Fortunately, the possible values for n1 are
discrete and bounded by n and hence, the problem can be solved in O(n) time.
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4.6.2 Optimizing Social Welfare
The social welfare s generated by our auction mechanism is the sum of the values of all
links times the probability that the link is visited. Since the auction is truthful, we can
assume that the bids equal the bidders actual value for being selected. Hence, the social
welfare is given by the following formula:
s =
n∑
i=1
vi · pseli
=
n∑
i=1
vi ·
 m∑
j=b(i)
∆pj · psel(Nj)
 (17)
The same argument which applies to maximizing the revenue also applies here: the
social welfare is a linear function with respect to those probabilities, which is maximized
if we set ∆pmax = 1−∆p0−pmax and ∆pm = pmax, or ∆pmax = 1−∆p0, respectively, and
all others to 0. Again, to optimize social welfare the auctioneer has to split the solutions
into at most two batches. Similar to r∗, we denote the social welfare when having two
batches as s∗:
s∗ =
(
n1∑
i=1
vi
)
· (1−∆p0 − pmax) · 1− (1− prel)
n1
n1
+(
n∑
i=1
vi
)
· pmax · 1− (1− prel)
n
n
(18)
As with r∗, s∗ can be maximized by iterating through all possible values for n1. There
are two properties of the maximal value for s∗ worth noting. First, the parameter n1
which maximizes s∗ does not maximize r∗ in general. This is easy to see when comparing
Equation 16 with Equation 18: r∗ depends on the value v2nd1 whereas s
∗ depends on all
values. Second, choosing n1 = n does not maximize s∗ in general. This is because the
more solutions are included in the ﬁrst batch, the more likely it is that a solution having
a low value will be chosen.
4.6.3 Optimizing User Experience
The user's experience is an important aspect of our auction we have not discussed so far.
Even if the data the auction is oﬀering to the user is for free, a user might switch to a
competitor oﬀering a similar service if the competitor can oﬀer a better user experience.
We have already seen that in both cases, optimizing revenue and optimizing social
welfare, the optimal choice of parameters results in two batches, one delivered as fast
as possible and the second one delivered at time tmax. Delaying a potentially big chunk
of the available solutions for this maximal delay tmax might damp the user's experience,
however. Of course, the user would prefer to receive all data in the ﬁrst batch, which is
delivered immediately. However, as we have seen in the previous section, delivering all
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data at once results in zero revenue and possibly suboptimal social welfare. Fortunately,
it is possible delaying some solutions without impacting the user experience too much.
The main argument is that a user will need some time to consume the solutions contained
in a batch. If the delay of the next batch is not larger than the time the user needs to
consume the current batch, the user will be able to seamlessly consume all the solution
from the diﬀerent batches.
Another aspect which can damp the user's experience is the fact that the delivery of
the data is biased in the sense that highly sponsored solutions are always delivered ﬁrst.
In Section 4.7, we discuss an extension of our model which reduces this bias.
4.6.4 Simulation
In this section, we illustrate how revenue and social welfare behave when there are only two
batches. Figure 4.4 shows four diﬀerent value distributions which we labeled with Linear,
Tableau, Dominant, and Equal, respectively. For our simulation, we set ∆p0 = 0.05,
prel = 0.6, and pmax = 0.1.
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Fig. 4.4: Value distribution for four diﬀerent scenarios.
Figure 4.5 shows the revenue for diﬀerent choices of n1. The revenue always starts at $0
for n1 = 0 and closes with $0 for n1 = 20. This is no surprise, as in both cases all solutions
are only assigned to a single batch and hence, the second price is $0. There are two
remarkable observations about the revenue, however. First, for the Tableau distribution,
the revenue stays the same for n1 = 5 up to n1 = 15. This happens because the second
value stays constant within this range, as the bids are all the same. Second, the Dominant
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and Equal distributions both have their maximum at n1 = 19. The reason for this is that
the highest bid within any distribution does not inﬂuence the revenue.
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Fig. 4.5: Revenue for diﬀerent values for n1 for the diﬀerent value distributions from
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.6 shows the social welfare for diﬀerent choices of n1. The social welfare is
always positive, no matter the choice of n1. For the Equal distribution the social welfare
is maximized for n1 = 20, but does not change much after n1 is beyond seven. The
values for n1 which maximize the social welfare for the Linear and Tableau distributions,
respectively, are quite close to the ones which maximize their respective revenue. The
Dominant distribution has its maximum for the social welfare for n1 = 1. Increasing n1
further increases the chance that a link with a lower value is chosen by the user and hence,
decreases social welfare. The Dominant distribution illustrates how far away the values
for n1 can be which maximize social welfare and revenue, respectively.
4.7 Extension
To mitigate the bias our auction introduces by delivering the highest sponsored data ﬁrst,
we propose an extension of our original model. The idea of this extension is to auction oﬀ
only part of the available positions in the batches and assign the rest of them randomly.
The result of this extension is similar to what users experience when using search engines:
Part of the results is sponsored content and ranked according to some bids, the other part
of the results is unbiased and only depends on what the user is searching for.
The ﬁrst step in our extension is to designate some slots in each batch which should be
reserved for sponsored solutions. We will denote with nsponsi and n
rand
i how many of the ni
slots in batch i are reserved for sponsored solutions or are assigned randomly, respectively.
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Fig. 4.6: Social welfare for diﬀerent values for n1 for the diﬀerent value distributions from
Figure 4.4.
The next step is to assign solutions to the random slots. We denote with nspons and nrand
the total number of sponsored slots and random slots, respectively, and with n the total
number of slots, which equals the total number of solutions for the query. Note that once
we have assigned all random slots, there are n−nrand solutions which did not receive any
slot, yet. These solutions are randomly arranged in a waiting queue, where the ﬁrst link
in the queue will be the ﬁrst one to occupy a newly open random slot.
The next step is to assign solutions to the sponsored slots. We start with the assignment
of the nspons1 slots in the ﬁrst batch. For this, we select the n
spons
1 solutions with the highest
bid from all those solutions which are not already assigned to the ﬁrst batch by the random
assignment. This means that some of the solutions get upgraded to the ﬁrst batch. An
upgraded solution can be either one of the solutions in the waiting queue or one of the
solution which already had a randomly assigned slot. In the latter case, the upgrading
creates a new open position for a randomly assigned slot, which is assigned to ﬁrst link in
the waiting queue. This procedure is applied sequentially to the sponsored slots nspons2 to
nsponsm . For every batch, we only consider those solutions which are currently in a higher
(and later) batch or the waiting queue.
Once we have the new ranking of the solutions, we can again calculate the weighted
VCG prices according to Deﬁnition 3. Note that the Theorem 1 does not anymore apply
to this new setting.
We conclude our extension with an example:
Example 1. Assume that there are four links with bids of $0, $10, $20, and $30. The left
part in Figure 4.7 shows a random assignment of the bids $0 and $30. The other two
bids, $10 and $20, are assigned to the waiting queue. The bid $20 takes precedence over
$10 inside the queue. The right part in Figure 4.7 shows the ﬁnal assignment of the bids.
The arrow labeled A indicates the ﬁrst step of the assignment of the sponsored slots:
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bid $30 gets to the ﬁrst sponsored slot, because it is the highest bid of those three bids,
$30, $20, and $10, which are not yet in batch 1. Next B , the bid $20 gets the random
slot previously occupied by $30, because bid $20 has the priority in the queue. Finally
C , bid $10 gets the last remaining sponsored slot because it is the highest (and only)
bid which did not yet get a slot in batch 1 or 2. The weighted VCG price is $0 for all
solutions which got a randomly assigned slot, eventually, because changing their bid to
$0 does not inﬂuence any other assignments of slots. This means that the bidders with
bids $0 and $20 do not pay if the user visits their link. The bidder with bid $10 also gets
a price of $0. This, because the bidder would have gotten in the second batch even with
a bid of $0. Finally, the weighted VCG price for the bidder with $30 is the value all other
bidders would have if bid $30 would have been $0, minus the value all other bidders have
for the current assignment.
Assume that prel = 0.8, ∆p1 = 0.5, and ∆p2 = 0.4. Hence, the probabilities of being
selected for the two ﬁrst slots are 0.20096 each, and for the second two slots 0.04096 each.
If bid $30 would be zero, the ﬁrst sponsored slot would be assigned to bid $20 and the
ﬁrst random slot would still belong to the bidder with the original bid $0. The second
sponsored slot would be assigned to bid $10. The second random slot would be assigned
to the bidder with the original bid of $30. The total value of this assignment is $4.4288.
The value of all other bidders for the original assignment is $1.2288. With a probability of
0.20096 of being selected, the weighted VCG price for the bidder with bid $30 is $15.92,
which has to be payed if the user visits the link.
$0
$30
$20 $10
1. 2.
$30
$0
$10
$20
A
B
C
Waiting Queue
Batch 1
Batch 2
Batch 1
Batch 2
Random
Sponsored
Random
Sponsored
Random
Random
Sponsored
Sponsored
Fig. 4.7: Example: four links get assigned to diﬀerent slots.
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4.8 Limitations and Conclusions
We introduced a new concept of a delayed-anser auction to ﬁnance free data in the WoD.
As we have seen, the choice of parameters can inﬂuence the generated revenue, generated
social welfare, and the user experience. In general, it is not possible to ﬁnd parameters
which maximizes all three of them. Hence, it is the choice of the auction designer to ﬁnd a
suitable trade-oﬀ between revenue, social welfare, and user experience. We also discussed
an extension which reduces the bias we introduce by prioritizing solutions containing links
with high bids.
Our new auction model is not restricted to the use case of the WoD. It can be applied
to any setting where multiple bidders can occupy the same slot and diﬀerent slots have
a decreasing probability of being selected. An additional restriction is that we assume
that all solutions have the same relevance to the user. As we discussed, this assumption
is reasonable in the WoD setting. In other settings, this assumption might not apply. In
this case, the auction might become more complicated because the probabilities of being
selected might not be separable anymore and hence, the weighted VCG auction is not
applicable.
One additional assumption we made is that there is only one sponsor per solution.
While this assumption might be true in most cases, it is possible that a user might issue
a query which contains multiple sponsored links per solution. In such situations, the bid
per solution can be deﬁned as the sum of the bids for each link contained in the solution.
With this deﬁnition, we could still apply our auction model, but we would have to ﬁnd
a way to distribute the weighted VCG payment among the bidders which placed a bid
on the same solution. If one decides to distribute the payments proportional to the bids
placed on the links, the auction would not anymore be truthful, however.
What is left for future work is the distribution of the generated revenue among the
data providers. The revenue can be used to ﬁnance those providers which proved to be
important for answering queries or subsidize those providers which struggle the most to
keep their services running.
With our concept of a delayed-answer auction, we provided a ﬁrst sponsored auction
model for the Web of Data. Whatever the limitations of our concept are, it represents a
ﬁrst model for a ﬁnancially sustainable and free Web of Data.
Chapter 5
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Abstract. RDF Stream Processing (RSP) has proposed solutions to continuously query streams
of RDF data. As a result, it is today possible to create complex networks of RSP engines to process
streaming data in a distributed and continuous fashion. Indeed, some approaches even allow to
distribute the computation across the web. But both producing high-quality data and providing
compute power to process it costs money.
The usual approach to ﬁnancing data on the Web of Data today is that either some sponsor
subsidizes it or the consumers are charged. In the stream setting consumers could exploit synergies
and, theoretically, share the access and processing fees, should their needs overlap. But what should
be the monetary contribution of each consumer when they have varying valuations of the diﬀering
outcomes?
In this article, we propose a model for price sharing in the RDF Stream Processing setting. Based
on the consumers' outcome valuations and the pricing of the raw data streams, our algorithm
computes utility-maximizing prices diﬀerent consumers should contribute whilst ensuring that all
the participants have no incentive of manipulating the system by providing misinformation about
their value, budget, or requested data stream. We show that our algorithm is able to calculate such
prices in a reasonable amount of time for up to one thousand simultaneous queries.
5.1 Introduction
The task of processing RDF data continuously in the form of streams has spawned various
extensions to SPARQL query processing systems [Anicic et al., 2011, Barbieri et al., 2010,
Calbimonte et al., 2010, Le-Phuoc et al., 2011]. RDF streams are produced and consumed
continuously, as opposed to static RDF data. The easy integration of RDF data allows
one to join, merge, aggregate, ﬁlter, and sample such data from various diﬀerent sources
and to produce new RDF streams. In contrast to traditional stream processing, RDF
Stream Processing (RSP) over the Web of Data (WoD) has two important unique features:
(1) RSP can be distributed over various loosely connected machines on the web [Mauri
et al., 2016, Taelman et al., 2016] and (2) diﬀerent RDF queries have a much higher
chance of overlapping computation because of the use of global identiﬁers. This unique
combination of distribution and overlap oﬀers new opportunities of exploiting synergies
by sharing resources to reduce the overall workload. At the same time, processing streams
is a continuous activity that may require a high amount of resourcesboth source data
and computing poweron an ongoing basis.
To date, research in the WoD has completely overlooked the question of how these
resources should be paid for [Grubenmann et al., 2017b]. Today, in most Web of Data
applications, processing is being paid for by a single entity that either proﬁts from the
data being processed in some way or has decided to subsidize it (e.g., to facilitate research
or economic growth). In the streaming domain, these processing fees would be incurred
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continuously as long as the streamed data is consumed. Also, given the distributed and po-
tentially overlapping nature of RSP as well as possibly varying valuation for the outcomes,
it is unclear how to share the processing fees. Pricing schemes for Cloud Computing do not
apply to this setting, unfortunately. This is because in cloud computation, the computa-
tional resources are split up between the customer and each of them pays an appropriate
price share. In our setting, however, the output of a single process can be shared among
diﬀerent entities. This adds an additional layer of complexity which is not considered in
pricing schemes for cloud computation.
As an example, consider the processing of Live TV viewership information. Channels
might be interested in audience demographics, advertisers in how many people have seen
an advertisement for a speciﬁc product, and recommender systems are interested in view-
ing histories. Each of the three entities: channel providers, advertisers, and recommender
systems have their own streaming query. However, there might be some overlap in the
computation they perform on these data and hence, some output can be reused for several
diﬀerent queries. As a result, computational resources can be saved by doing the respective
computation only once and, in turn, the channel providers, advertisers, and recommender
systems can save some money by sharing the price of this computation.
How much should each of them contribute to the payment for gathering and processing
the various pieces of data that answer their diﬀering but overlapping queries?
This paper proposes a novel model to study the sustainability of continuously process-
ing RDF data. It takes the joint execution plan, which is based on the collected queries of
all data consumers, of existing multi-query optimizers as an input. Then, it combines this
query execution plan with the outcome valuations and run-time limits (i.e., the length of
time during which a query answer is needed) from all data consumers, the pricing of the
raw data streams, and the pricing of the computation to determine a utility-maximizing
payment distribution (i.e., it ensures that each consumer gets the most value out of the
price they pay). Assuming that the prices of the raw data are given, our payment allo-
cation ensures that the data consumers have no incentive of manipulating the system by
providing misinformation about their value, budget, or requested data streama property
economists call truthfulness.
Our contributions are, hence, as follows: (1) we introduce a formal setting for price
sharing in RDF Stream Processing (which to our knowledge is the ﬁrst attempt to do
so), (2) we present a set of requirements that a price sharing system should fulﬁl, (3) we
propose a model for price sharing that maximizes the data consumer's beneﬁts (or utility)
whilst incentivizing them to be honest about their desiderata, and (4) evaluate the runtime
and the savings of money for our proposed model empirically showing that our algorithm
is able to calculate such prices in a reasonable amount of time for up to one thousand
simultaneous queries.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will discuss some related work and intro-
duce some motivating examples which would beneﬁt from our market model. Next, we
introduce a formal model, show how to solve the cost-sharing problem, and evaluate the
runtime and cost savings of the overall system. Finally, we discuss some limitations of our
work and conclude our paper.
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5.2 Related Work
RDF Stream Processing: The origins of RDF Stream Processing [Dell'Aglio et al.,
2017] can be found on the combination of Semantic Web technologies with Information
Flow Processing (IFP) systems [Cugola and Margara, 2012]. IFP solutions can broadly be
grouped in Data Stream Management (DSMS) systems [Babock et al., 2002] and Complex
Event Processing (CEP) systems [Luckham, 2001].
The former ones typically use operators (e.g. sliding windows) to convert portions of
the streams in relations, to be managed with classical relational algebra operators, whilst
the latter ones analyze the stream to detect relevant event patterns (e.g., sequences).
The two paradigms share the idea of continuous query answering, i.e., the query is
issued once and results are computed at several time instants to take into account the
availability of new data in the stream.
DSMS inspired several languages such as C-SPARQL [Barbieri et al., 2010], CQELS-
QL [Le-Phuoc et al., 2011] and SPARQLstream [Calbimonte et al., 2010], that extend
SPARQL to achieve continuous query answering on RDF streams. Similarly, the CEP
paradigm inspired languages as EP-SPARQL [Anicic et al., 2011] and STARQL [Özçep
et al., 2014]. Finally, INSTANS [Rinne et al., 2012] follows a diﬀerent approach: instead of
extending SPARQL, it performs continuous evaluation of interconnected SPARQL queries.
These new solutions allowed for new and interesting applications. [Wagner et al.,
2010] describes a scenario where information from energy producers, grid operators, and
appliance manufacturers must be collected and processed. Smart city projects [Puiu et al.,
2016, Tallevi-Diotallevi et al., 2013] aim at processing stream data produced by the daily
city life to optimize the city's operational tasks.
Financial Cost Sharing: Shapley deﬁned in [Shapley, 1953] two key axioms for cost
sharing: (1) the cost shares should be additive dependent on the total costs and (2) if
a participant demand does not increase the overall cost, the cost share should be zero.
[Aumann and Shapley, 1974] introduced the Aumann-Shapley rule, which charges each
participant prices based on the integral of the marginal cost. This pricing rule was suc-
cessfully applied by [Billera et al., 1978] to a telephone billing problem.
Serial Cost Sharing [Moulin and Shenker, 1992] is a pricing method which is robust
to coalition deviations if participants are not allowed to redistribute their outputs. More
recently, [Moulin and Laigret, 2011] introduced a method of dividing up the costs of a
network when diﬀerent participants require diﬀerent subsets of the resources. Our method
expands the equal need cost share deﬁned in [Moulin and Laigret, 2011].
None of the related work addressed cost sharing in a setting where diﬀerent partic-
ipants require the resources for diﬀerent, overlapping time periods and participants can
potentially manipulate the model by misinformation.
5.3 Motivating Example
Consider a setting where diﬀerent sources for streaming RDF data provide viewership data
for TV channels, the Electronic Program Guide (EPG) data for those channels, activity
data from social networks, and news feeds from news networks. Here, there are various
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consumers who are interested in these data sources: TV channels can use them to learn
which TV shows are the most popular and improve their programming, advertisement
networks could use them to improve their advertising strategies based on the people's
current interests, and providers of recommender services can use them to improve their
recommendations.
Since all these consumers are interested in the same underlying sources, there can be
some opportunity for price sharing. Figure 5.1 shows a possible scenario, where a TV
channel, an ad network, and a recommender system are interested in the same data but
require diﬀerent computation on these data. The arrows in the ﬁgure indicate the ﬂow of
data. In our example, the TV channel is only interested in the combination of viewership
data and the EPG data, which results in data about the viewers of a speciﬁc show. The
streaming query of the TV channel accesses this viewer-per-show data and processes it
further. The ad network and the recommender system are also interested in combining
the viewer-per-show data with some data from social networks to include to social media
responses. Each of the two, the ad network and the recommender system, does some
additional computation on the data speciﬁc for their individual requirement. As obvious
from the ﬁgure, the price of some computational nodes and some of the sources could be
shared by the consumers.
TV channel
Ad Network
Recommender
System
Viewership
Data
EPG
Data
Social Network
Data
Viewer per Show
Viewer and Social Media responses per Show
Source
Consumer
Computation
Fig. 5.1: TV channels, ad networks, and recommender systems are interested in the same
data but require diﬀerent computation.
5.4 Model
We build our model for price sharing in stream processing based upon the general archi-
tecture of stream processing [Carney et al., 2002, Cugola and Margara, 2012, Margara
et al., 2014, Stonebraker et al., 2005], which means that our model can be applied to any
instance of this general architecture, irrespective of the exact details of the implementa-
tion. In this general architecture, sources produce streams of data which are processed by
operators producing new streams, which are eventually propagated to interested actors.
A consumer can submit a query, which captures what computation should be performed.
As the operators are processing data continuously over time, one can associate a price per
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time for each operator. Likewise, a price per time can be associated to each source that
streams data into our model. The price per time for sources and operators is determined
by the provider of the respective service.
With the sharing of the price of sources and operators comes the question of how
these fees should be distributed to the diﬀerent consumers. For this, our model needs
some additional information in addition to the queries and prices. Precisely, our model
needs to know from the consumer their value coeﬃcient, budget, and time limit for the
query.
Value and value coeﬃcient: The value coeﬃcient indicates how much a consumer is
maximally willing to pay for running the query for a certain time. As with the price,
the value is given as a constant which indicates the value per time. Multiplying the value
coeﬃcient with the actual runtime gives the consumer's value for running the query during
the allocated runtime.
Budget: The budget indicates how much the consumer is willing to pay in total for
running the query. The consumer's payment has to be lower or equal the budget.
Time Limit: The time limit indicates how long the consumer is interested in processing
the streaming data, at most. Similar to the budget, the time limit acts as an upper bound
but on the runtime of the query instead of the payment. We use a time limit instead of
a ﬁxed time for the stream query execution because the latter might violate the value or
budget constraints of the consumer.
The combination of value, budget, and time limit allows a consumer some control over
which allocations of run-time and prices would be beneﬁcial for him and which allocations
would not. Our model maximizes the consumer's utility, which is the value for the allocated
runtime minus the payment she/he has to pay.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst deﬁne the requirements we want our model to fulﬁl,
followed by a discussion about how to distribute the fees. Next, we discuss how total prices
and runtimes of queries can be calculated based on these distributed fees. Afterwards, we
discuss to which degree our model meets our requirements.
5.4.1 Requirements for a Sustainable Model
In this section, we identify three requirements that a price sharing model for stream
processing should satisfy in order to ensure a sustainable model.
Beneﬁts from participating: It is key to ensure that each consumer beneﬁts from
its participation in our model. Each consumer should have as least as high utility as he
would have by running his query in isolation, without collaborating and sharing prices
with others. In other words, the beneﬁt should consist of an increment in utility, whenever
this is possible due to overlapping sources or operators. This leads to our ﬁrst requirement:
[R1] A consumer must have strictly higher utility when there is some overlap of sources
or computation with other queries.
This requirement is crucial to ensure that consumers gain advantage for using our
model. Note that Requirement R1 assumes that the customer has strictly higher utility
than running the query outside of our model, if there is any potential for price sharing. In
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the case that a query has no overlapping computation or sources with other queries, there
is no opportunity for price sharing and the customer should have at least as high utility
as when not participating in our model. If the model fails to achieve this requirement, it
would not be very attractive for consumers.
No beneﬁts from misreporting paramters: The model needs the following parame-
ters as input from the user: value coeﬃcient, budget, and time limit. As these parameters
inﬂuence the price sharing mechanism, we have to investigate how participants could
beneﬁt by misreporting these parameters. Misreporting in this context means reporting a
parameter which deviates from the participants true parameter in order to gain an advan-
tage. Requirement R2 makes the model robust against manipulations from the customer
with respect to value, execution time limit, and budget:
[R2] No consumer must be able to beneﬁt by misreporting value coeﬃcient, time limit,
or budget.
If the model would encourage such manipulations, directly or indirectly, it would enable
some consumers to increase their utility by gaming the model. The problem is that such
gains in utility are always at the expense of other consumer's utilities. This is because
our model maximizes each consumer's utility given the utilities of the other participants
and hence, any further gain in utility must result in a decrease of utility for some other
participant.
No beneﬁts from query deviation: The last requirement ensures that there is no
beneﬁt for a consumer to strategically change his original query to increase utility.
[R3] No consumer must be able to beneﬁt from deviating from his original query.
This means that a customer should not be able to get a higher utility by changing
his or her query. Again, if this were the case, a consumer could increase his utility at the
expense of other consumers' utilities.
5.4.2 Price Sharing
The algorithm for the price sharing extends the equal need cost sharing method presented
in [Moulin and Laigret, 2011] by introducing value coeﬃcient, budget, and time limit as
additional paramters. In equal need cost sharing, each participant receives an equal share
of the costs. Applying this to our setting, each consumer who requires a source/operator
for his computation receives an equal share of the price of this source/operator. The total
price for a consumer's query is the sum of all the price shares of all required sources and
operators.
This algorithm has a time complexity of O(n), where n is the number of queries. This
is because for each query one has to determine the relevant sources and operators. This
number is determined by the kind of query and does not grow with the number of queries.
After the relevant sources and operators are determined for each query, the costs of each
source and operator have to be distributed. This has a time complexity of O(s+o), where
s is the number of sources and o is the number of operators. In the worst case, each query
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introduces a certain number of new sources and operators which do not coincide with
existing sources and operators. Hence, both s and o grow in the worst case linearly with
n. In the best case, all relevant sources and operators for a new query are already part of
the topology of sources and operators and s and o do not increase. Therefore, the time
complexity is O(n). Figure 5.2 shows an example of how the prices are distributed. The
framed labels indicate all the queries for which the source/operator is relevant and the
associated price for each query.
Note that diﬀerent queries can have diﬀerent runtimes in our model. Hence, the cost of
a query varies over time. The algorithm calculates the cost distribution for a given topology
of sources and operators. As soon as a new query arrives in the model or a running query
stops execution, the topology changes and the price distribution is recalculated.
A function calculatePriceShares embeds the algorithm for distributing the
prices. We will refer to this function in the next section.
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price = $1/d
price = $2/d
price = $3/d
price = $2/d
price = $1/d
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share = $11/d
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Fig. 5.2: Distribution of prices among diﬀerent queries
5.4.3 Allocation and Pricing
After the calculation of the associated price for each query, our model can determine (1)
how long each query should be executed, which we call the allocated runtime and (2) how
much this query execution should cost for the consumer, which we call the total price.
Algorithm 5.1 shows how runtime and payment are computed given the value coeﬃ-
cients, budgets, and time limits of the consumers. After the return values are initialized
(Lines 20 and 20), a set S of indices ranging from 1 to n is initialized (Line 20). Each
index i ∈ S relates to a speciﬁc query qi. The set represents all queries for which the
computation of prices and runtime is still in process.
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The algorithm calculates prices and runtimes in a loop until this set is empty (Lines
20 to 30). For this, the algorithm enters in another loop (Lines 21 to 25) which calculates
the price share pi for each query qi for i ∈ S according to the method described in Section
5.4.2 (Line 22) and then checks for each query whether the value is smaller than the price
(Lines 22 to 24). If the query qi has lower value than the calculated price, the utility of the
query would drop by allocating more runtime. Consequently, the query will be removed
from the set S (Line 24) and it will not be considered for further allocations. If an index
is removed from S, the prices have to be recalculated, as the corresponding query is not
anymore available to share the prices. The loop continues to calculate new prices and
remove indices until all the remaining queries qi for i ∈ S have positive utility by getting
more runtime allocated and consequently, there are no more indices to be removed from
S (Line 25).
The next step is to calculate for each query qi the value τ , which indicates how much
runtime can be allocated at most to the query. τ is the minimum of the remaining time
limit Ti and the remaining budget bi divided by the price pi (Line 27). These values
get updated at each iteration. Next, τmin gets updated, which is the smallest value of τ
encountered during the iterations (Line 27). τmin is the runtime that will be allocated
to each query in S, eventually. The queries get only the smallest overall value allocated
because after the time period τmin at least one query will drop out and the prices have to
be recalculated. Finally, the allocated runtime ti, the time limit Ti, the payment pii, and
the budget bi are updated to reﬂect the allocated time (Lines 28 to 29). If the remaining
runtime limit Ti or budget bi is exhausted, the query qi will not be considered for further
runtime allocations, as this would violate the queries budget and/or runtime limit, and
the index i is removed from S (Line 30).
In the following, we provide an example for Algorithm 5.1:
Example 1. In this example, we use the queries and prices from Figure 5.2. For this,
we assume that the three queries q1, q2, and q3 have value coeﬃcients v1 = 4, v2 = 20,
v3 = 10, budgets b1 = 10, b2 = 31, b3 = 20, and runtime limits T1 = 2, T2 = 5, T3 = 2.5.
After initializing the values, the algorithm deﬁnes S = {1, 2, 3}. Afterwards, the algo-
rithm calculates the prices which are depicted in Figure 5.2: p1 = 5.5, p2 = 11, p3 = 4.5.
As p1 > v1, the algorithm removes the ﬁrst query from S. This leaves the algorithm with
S = {2, 3}. As S has changed, the prices have to be recalculated, this time without q1. This
leads to the following price shares: p2 = 15.5 < v2, p3 = 4.5 < v3. Next, the algorithm
calculates tmin = 2 =
b2
p2
. It allocates this runtime to q2 and q3 and update budget, allocated
runtime, runtime limit, and price: b2 = 0, b3 = 11, t2 = 2, t3 = 2, T2 = 3, T3 = 0.5,
pi2 = 31, pi3 = 9. As the budget of q2 reached zero, the query gets removed from S.
In the second iteration of the algorithm, S only contains the index 3. The new price
share for q3 is p3 = 7 < 10. This time, tmin = 0.5 = T3, as the remaining runtime
limit is smaller than the remaining budget divided by the cost. As before, budget, allocated
runtime, runtime limit, and price get updated: b3 = 7.5, t3 = 2.5, T3 = 0, pi3 = 12.5. As q3
reaches T3 = 0, it also gets removed from S and S becomes empty and hence, the algorithm
terminates. The algorithm returns for each query the allocated runtime and total price:
t1 = 0, t2 = 2, t3 = 2.5, pi1 = 0, pi2 = 31, pi3 = 12.5.
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Algorithm 5.1 Allocation and pricing algorithm
Data: Value coeﬃcients v1, . . . , vn, budgets b1, . . . , bn, time limits T1, . . . , Tn
Result: Allocated runtimes t1, . . . , tn, total prices pi1, . . . , pin
20 t1, . . . , tn ← 0 pi1, . . . , pin ← 0 S ← {1, . . . , n} while S 6= ∅ do
21 do
22 p1, . . . , pn ← calculatePriceShares(S) for i ∈ S do
23 if vi < pi then
24 S ← S \ {i}
25 while A query has been removed from S
26 τmin ← +∞ for i ∈ S do
27 τ ← min
(
bi
pi
, Ti
)
τmin ← min(τmin, τ)
28 for i ∈ S do
29 ti ← ti + τmin Ti ← Ti− τmin pii ← bi + τmin · pi bi ← bi− τmin · pi if bi ≤ 0 or Ti
≤ 0 then
30 S ← S \ {i}
31 return t1, . . . , tn, pi1, . . . , pin
As discussed before, calculatePriceShares runs in O(n) time, where n is the
number of queries. Each for loop in Algorithm 5.1 runs at most n times, because |S|≤ n.
The outer while loop also runs at most n times because at each iteration, at least one
element is removed from S. Finally, also the inner while loop runs at most n times because
the loops stops when no more element from S are removed and there are at most n elements
which can be removed from S. This means that Algorithm 5.1 has a runtime complexity
of O(n2). The space complexity is O(n) as the algorithm has to keep track of a constant
number of values for each query.
5.4.4 Properties of the Cost Sharing Algorithm
We now study to which degree Algorithm 5.1 fulﬁls the requirements.
Requirement R1. To see that each consumer beneﬁts from participation (R1), note
that our price sharing method guarantees that a consumer shares prices only from those
operators and sources relevant for the query. Hence, the assigned price share can never be
higher than the price of running the query in isolation, in which case the isolated query
has to cover the whole price alone. In addition, if there is any overlap in common sources
or operators with other queries, the assigned price share will be strictly cheaper than
running the query in isolation. Next, it is important to note that Algorithm 5.1 allocates
runtime and charges payments as long as the assigned price share is smaller or equal
than the consumer's value. This means that the consumer's utility is maximized, given
the information provided, because as long as the value is still higher or equal than the
price, any additional runtime increases the overall utility by the diﬀerence between the
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value and the price share. In addition, the algorithm never allocates a runtime to a query
which would exceed the runtime limit or would cause to surpass the budget. Since the
consumer's utility is maximized given the assigned price shares, and the assigned price
shares are smaller (or equal if there is no price sharing possible), the consumer's utility
must be smaller (or equal) than running the query in isolation. Hence, each consumer
proﬁts from our model.
Requirement R2. A crucial part to fulﬁl Requirement R1 is the assumption that each
consumer provides value, runtime limit, and budget, truthfully. However, this might not
be the case, necessarily. In order that the assumption can be considered realistic, our
model has to make sure that a consumer cannot gain utility by misreporting about his
or her utility. As our model guarantees to maximize the consumers' utilities given the
assigned price shares, a consumer can only proﬁt from misreporting if this yields a lower
price assignment. While our price sharing algorithm takes into account the parameters
given by the consumer, these parameters are only used to determine if, and for how long
a given query is executed. Using equal need cost sharing guarantees that the price shares
themselves are independent of these parameters. Hence, the price assignments cannot be
inﬂuenced by misreporting and, consequently, no consumer can beneﬁt from this.
Requirement R3. We have just shown that a consumer cannot beneﬁt from manipula-
tion by misreporting value, runtime limit, or budget. The remaining opportunity for an
illegitimate utility gain would be trough manipulating the query itself. The question is
whether a consumer can gain utility by modifying the query. Requirement R3 is satisﬁed
under the following conditions:
Condition 1 (No partial value). A consumer has no value for a partial stream. A partial
stream is the result of running the query only on a subset of all the relevant operators and
sources.
Condition 2 (No external collaboration). Diﬀerent consumers cannot collaborate exter-
nally, that is, accessing data together as one consumer and then splitting the streaming
data and payments among each other outside of the model.
Condition 1 ensures that a consumer has zero value for the streaming result if any of
the relevant sources or operators is removed from the model. This condition is important
because the model assumes that the declared value of the consumer reﬂects the consumers
true valuation of the received data stream. If a consumer had a value for partial streams,
the model would have missing information on the value on this partial stream. Hence, the
model would not be able to decide whether the current setting would indeed maximize the
customer's utility. Therefore, the customer would have an opportunity to gain utility by
deviating from the original query such that only the partial stream is queried. An extension
to our model where a customer can provide multiple valuations for multiple (partial)
streams could, however, circumvent this problem. However, this would add another layer
of complexity because diﬀerent valuations for the partial stream would require a multi-
objective optimization. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
Condition 2 ensures that multiple consumers cannot collaborate outside the model. If
this would be possible, a group of consumers could act as one consumer inside our model
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and reduce the assigned price share, potentially. This is because our algorithm for the
price distribution calculates the price shares based on the diﬀerent queries present in the
model. A special kind of license attached to the streaming result of the query could, for
example, prohibit the redistribution of the queries outside the legal entity (a person or
company) which bought the data. Again, this is beyond the scope of our paper, however.
Under these two conditions, we can now show that Requirement R3 is also fulﬁlled
by our model: the only way to beneﬁt by deviating from the query is by introducing
additional sources and operators, or, by removing sources and operators and doing part
of the access/computation locally. Introducing additional sources and operators does not
beneﬁt the consumer, as these additional nodes do not change the price distribution of
existing sources and operators. Hence, introducing such additional nodes only increase
the associated price share for a query. Removing sources and operators does not yield
a reduced price share, either. This is because with each source or operator which is not
shared with other queries, the consumer has to compensate the full price instead of only
part of it. As a result, the consumer has no incentive to deviate from the original query.
5.5 Evaluation
The aim of the evaluation is to study the runtime behavior and ﬁnancial advantages of
using our price sharing model. The runtime of our algorithm is a crucial metric because
the price shares needs to be updated whenever a new query arrives in the system. The
total number of participating queries is limited by how fast our algorithm can integrate
new queries by recalculating the price shares. The more queries are participating in the
price sharing, the more potential money savings for each participant.
For the evaluation, we created randomly generated graphs, as described below. We
used an artiﬁcial setting because we wanted to measure the behavior of our model under
varying degree of overlap with otherwise equal conditions. No real world dataset would
allow such a ﬁne grained control of the desired parameter.
We used a ﬁxed model for the continuous queries where each query consists of 7
operator nodes and 8 source nodes. Each operator has two inputs and one output. The
computational nodes are arranged in 3 layers (Figure 5.3). In total there are 500 sources
available in our scenario.
To build the scenario for our evaluation, we create a number of n diﬀerent queries. Each
newly added query has for each operator node an overlap probability p that a particular
node coincides with an existing node belonging to the same layer. If two nodes coincide,
their child nodes in subsequent layers do as well. In addition, we created 500 source nodes
from which each operator node in layer 4 randomly chooses 2. The number of sources is
ﬁxed and does not grow with the number of queries in the evaluation. Table 5.1 shows
the total number of nodes (including sources) for diﬀerent number of queries and diﬀerent
overlap probability p.
For our evaluation, we focused on the budget as the constraining parameter. Since all
three parameters, value coeﬃcient, time limit, and budget act as a constraint on the same
outcome variable, the allocated runtime, it is suﬃcient to study the inﬂuence of one of
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Table 5.1: Number of nodes for diﬀerent number of queries and diﬀerent overlap proba-
bility p.
Queries p = 0 p = 0.1 p = 0.2 p = 0.3 p = 0.4 p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9 p = 1
1 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507
10 570 566 554 540 545 535 528 526 523 517 516
100 1200 1114 1012 898 873 828 732 706 652 623 606
1000 7500 6493 5583 4942 4180 3516 2904 2475 2102 1780 1506
10000 70500 60831 51977 44146 37270 30436 24859 20154 16062 13011 10506
them. In our setting, each operator node and each source have a price of 1. The value
coeﬃcient and the time limit is set to inﬁnite for each query. This means that the budget
is the only constraining parameter. The budget for each query is a uniformly randomly
assigned value between 0 and 1, which prevents diﬀerent queries having the exact same
allocated runtime, a situation that would be very unrealistic and would improve the
runtime of the allocation algorithm heavily.
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Consumer
Source
Computation
Fig. 5.3: A query with 7 operator nodes and 8 source nodes.
For the purpose of this evaluation, the algorithm was implemented in Java and ex-
ecuted on a quad-core 2.8 GHz i7 processor, 16GB of RAM. Figure 5.4 shows the time
needed to do the calculation of the price sharing and the allocated runtime. The top graph
in Figure 5.4 shows how the calculation time varies for diﬀerent probabilities and over
diﬀerent number of queries. As we can see, the calculation time does not vary much when
varying the overlap probability p but does vary much when varying the number of queries.
The bottom graph shows how much runtime a query gets allocated on average for dif-
ferent overlap probabilities and diﬀerent number of queries. Note that a query gets more
allocated runtime the more overlap the queries have and the more queries are present in
our model. The reason for this is that more overlap clearly means more sharing between
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queries and hence, more money savings for each query. The higher the number of queries,
the higher is the positive inﬂuence of overlapping computation, as there are more queries
which share prices.
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Fig. 5.4: Calculation time and allocated runtime.
5.6 Limitations and Conclusion
The growing interest in streaming data creates new opportunities for the WoD to save
money by sharing computational fees. Inspired by the easy data integration of the WoD,
we studied scenarios where diﬀerent continuous queries share the price of common oper-
ations and common sources. As we have seen, consumers can proﬁt from price sharing
in stream processing settings. Our proposed method allows calculating payments which
ensure participation and do not encourage manipulation.
Our method is somewhat limited in its scalability when tens of thousands of queries
are simultaneously involved in our algorithm. Whilst this is a very large number that
will ﬁrst have to be reached in practical environments, we do foresee solutions to this
limitation: ﬁrst, queries can be partitioned into smaller groups of only a few thousands
of queries and the price sharing can be done for each such partition individually. Second,
one can try to relax some of the requirements we imposed on the price sharing in favor
of better runtime of the algorithm. Third, one might ﬁnd approximating algorithms with
reasonable properties. Another possible drawback could be found in the assumptions. We
suggested that the pricing of the raw data is exogenous/given: in current scenarios this
seems reasonable, but we will have to be explore the pricing of the raw data in future
work.
Whatever the limitations, our paper signiﬁes a ﬁrst step in exploring an extremely
important problem in RDF Stream processing: how to fund the data production and
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computation. We believe that the requirements we stated in our paper are an important
aspect of price sharing in the streaming setting and that every solution which aims at
implementing price sharing in this setting has to address those requirements. As far as
we know, our paper is the ﬁrst to introduce a price sharing algorithm that both adhere
to these requirements and is feasible under realistic run-time constraints. As such, our
contribution paves the way for research on establishing realistic price sharing approaches
for stream processing.
Part III
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